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   Can	   the	   government	   employ	   drones	   domestically	   without	   running	  
roughshod	  over	  personal	  privacy?	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  preemptively	  rein	  in	  potential	  
government	  overreach,	  most	  states	  have	  proposed	   legislation	  that	  restricts	  or	  
forbids	   government	   drone	   use.	   	   The	   intent	   is	   to	   prevent	   drone	   use	   for	  
warrantless	   information	   and	   evidence	   collection.	   	   Ironically,	   many	   of	   these	  
proposals	   will	   have	   the	   opposite	   affect	   intended.	   	   State-­‐by-­‐state	   drone	  
legislation	  may	  lead	  to	  consequences	  such	  as	  the	  erosion	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  
jurisprudential	   principles,	   losses	   of	   life	   and	   property,	   procedural	   windfalls	   to	  
criminals,	  and	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  the	  military.	  	  
	   Lawmakers	   should	   take	   a	   nuanced	   approach	   to	   government	   drone	   use	  
rather	  than	  selectively	  revising	  constitutional	  protections.	  	  A	  nuanced	  approach	  
would	  allow	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  use	  drones	  to	  their	  full	  potential	  while	  
also	  protecting	  personal	  privacies.	   	  There	  are	  four	  principles	  that	  should	  guide	  
drone	   legislation:	   (1)	   apply	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   agnostically;	   (2)	   ensure	  
operational	   purpose	   language	   distinguishes	   between	   law	   enforcement	   and	  
non-­‐law	   enforcement	   professionals;	   (3)	   focus	   new	   regulations	   focus	   on	  
information	   collection,	   dissemination,	   and	   retention;	   (4)	   develop	   narrowly	  
tailored	   remedies	   that	   deter	   specific	   behavior	   consistent	   with	   their	   historical	  
purpose.	  	  Drone	  legislation	  drafted	  with	  these	  principles	  in	  mind	  will	  protect	  our	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   Federal	   drone	   use	   does	   not	   have	   to	   come	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   protecting	  
personal	  privacy.	  	  The	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA)	  Modernization	  and	  
Reform	  Act	  of	  2012	  mandates	  the	  “safe	   integration	  of	  civil	  unmanned	  aircraft	  
systems”	   into	   the	   national	   airspace	   system	  by	   the	   end	   of	   2015.	   	   It	  makes	   no	  
mention	  however,	  of	  privacy	  protections.	   	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  Federal	  guidance,	  
states	   have	   jumped	   into	   the	   fray.	   	   Most	   states	   have	   proposed	   restrictive	  
legislation	   that	   limits	   government	   drone	   use	   for	   collecting	   information	   and	  
evidence	   on	   residents	   or	   their	   property.	   	   In	   comparing	   state	   legislation	   and	  
Department	   of	   Defense	   (“DoD”)	   policies	   within	   established	   constitutional	  
principles,	  this	  article	  seeks	  to	  present	  a	  coherent	  framework	  that	  provides	  for	  
the	  protection	  of	  civil	  liberties	  while	  unlocking	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  government	  
drone	  use.	  	  
	   	  Part	  II	  of	  this	  article	  details	  the	  state	  legislative	  landscape.	  	  Part	  III	  discusses	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current	   DoD	   policies	   that	   apply	   to	   drones,	   in	   contrast	   to	   proposed	   state	  
legislation.	   	   Part	   IV	   explores	   the	   unintended	   consequences	   that	   state	   drone	  
legislation	  may	  have	  on	   civilian	  and	  military	  drone	  operations	  and	   the	  Fourth	  
Amendment.	   	   It	   also	   proposes	   four	   principles	   that	   should	   guide	   future	   state	  
drone	  legislation.	  
II. THE	  STATE	  LEGISLATIVE	  LANDSCAPE	  
	   Drone	  legislation	  and	  policy	  is	  a	  dynamic	  issue.1	  	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  
of	  states	  have	  proposed	  legislation	  to	  regulate	  drone	  use.2	   	  Almost	  half	  of	  the	  
states	  are	  entertaining	  multiple	  bills	  simultaneously.3	  	  Eight	  states	  have	  already	  
passed	   drone	   legislation.4	   	   The	   stated	   purpose	   or	   need	   for	   such	   action	   is	  
generally	   to	  either	  protect	   citizens’	  privacy	  or	   to	  be	   free	   from	  “unwarranted”	  
surveillance.5	  	  Most	  of	  these	  bills	  apply	  to	  local	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  
prohibit	   them	   from	   using	   drones	   to	   collect	   information	   or	   evidence,	   with	  
certain	  exceptions.	   	  Many	   levy	  administrative	   requirements	  on	  drone	  use	  and	  
contain	  significant	  ramifications	  for	  violating	  them.	  	  A	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  
of	  these	  state	  provisions	  follows.	  	  	  
A. Applicability	  of	  State	  Legislation	  
	   Restrictive	  state	  drone	  proposals	  are	  often	  too	  broadly	  written.	  	  While	  most	  
state	   drone	   proposals	   apply	   to	   state	   governmental	   actors,	   many	   are	   written	  
broadly	   enough	   to	   apply	   to	   Federal	   government	   and	   military	   operators.	  	  
Furthermore,	   they	   generally	   do	   not	   regard	   the	   unique	   responsibilities	   or	  
requirements	   of	   each	   entity.	   	   All	   but	   nine	   of	   the	   eighty-­‐six	   state	   drone	   bills	  
surveyed	  across	  forty-­‐seven	  states	  apply	  to	  state,	  county,	  or	  municipal	  agency	  
officials	  or	  employees.6	  	  Most	  apply	  to	  local	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  directly	  
                                                
1	  Some	  of	  the	  bills	  discussed	  herein	  have	  already	  died	  in	  committee,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  of	  
publication,	  more	  bills	  will	  have	  been	  introduced.	  	  The	  usefulness	  of	  this	  review	  is	  to	  
understand	  trends	  as	  a	  likely	  predictor	  of	  future	  action.	  
2Only	  seven	  states	  have	  yet	  to	  introduce	  a	  bill:	  	  CO,	  CT,	  DE,	  LA,	  MS,	  SD,	  and	  UT.	  
3	  Twenty-­‐four	  states	  (AK,	  AZ,	  AR,	  CA,	  GA,	  IL,	  IN,	  IA,	  KY,	  MA	  MI,	  MN,	  NJ,	  NY,	  NC,	  OK,	  OR,	  PA,	  RI,	  
SC,	  TN,	  VA,	  WA,	  and	  WV)	  have	  introduced	  two	  or	  more	  bills.	  
4	  FL,	  ID,	  IL,	  MT,	  OR,	  TN,	  TX,	  and	  VA	  have	  all	  passed	  drone	  legislation.	  
5	  See	  supra	  note	  2	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  various	  bill	  titles.	  	  
6	  Almost	  ninety	  percent	  of	  bills	  apply	  to	  state	  employees.	  	  Of	  those	  that	  do	  not,	  five	  create	  task	  
forces,	  committees	  or	  legislative	  study	  groups	  to	  make	  recommendations	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  
drone	  use	  on	  privacy.	  	  See	  Enrolled	  H.R.	  6,	  28th	  Leg.	  (Alaska	  2013);	  H.B.	  2269,	  51st	  Leg.,	  1st	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  S.R.	  217,	  2013	  Leg.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.R.	  27,	  118th	  Gen.	  
Assemb.,	  1st	  Sess.,	  (Ind.	  2013);	  H.	  Comm.	  Res.	  101	  (W.	  Va.	  2013)	  	  Two	  either	  appropriate	  funds	  
for	  drone	  operations	  or	  request	  the	  FAA	  to	  consider	  their	  state	  a	  test	  site.	  	  See	  Assemb.	  J.	  Res.	  
6,	  2013-­‐2014	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  385,	  77th	  Leg.	  (Nev.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  507,	  77th	  Leg.	  
2013]	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or	  by	   implication.7	   	   Thirty-­‐five	   state	  drone	  proposals	   also	   specifically	   apply	   to	  
the	   federal	   government.8	   	   Other	   state	   drone	   provisions	   apply	   to	   “persons,”	  
                                                                                                                             
(Nev.	  2013).	  	  The	  New	  Hampshire	  bill	  only	  applies	  to	  private	  persons	  and,	  in	  fact,	  specifically	  
excludes	  government	  agencies	  from	  its	  prohibition	  on	  knowingly	  imaging	  the	  exteriors	  of	  
residential	  dwellings.	  	  H.B.	  619,	  ¶	  IV-­‐a,	  2013	  Sess.	  (N.H.	  2013).	  
7	  S.B.	  317,	  §	  1(2)	  (Ala.	  2013);	  H.B.	  159a,	  28th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Alaska	  2013)	  (amending	  §	  4.	  AS	  
1865,	  Art.	  13,	  §	  18.65.900);	  H.B.	  2574,	  51st	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013)	  (amending	  §	  1,	  Tit.	  
13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  A);	  H.B.	  1904,	  89th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ark.	  2013)	  (amending	  
Ark.	  Code	  Tit.	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐103);	  Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Tit.	  14,	  14350(b)	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  5	  
(Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  92,	  §	  1(3)	  (Fla.	  2013);	  S.B.	  200,	  §	  4(1),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ga.	  2013);	  H.B.	  560,	  §	  2	  
(Ga.	  2013)	  (amending	  Art.	  2	  of	  Ch.	  5	  of	  Tit.	  17	  Code	  of	  Ga.	  Ann.	  as	  17-­‐5-­‐33(1)	  and	  (2));	  S.B.	  83,	  §	  
2563B-­‐2(b),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Haw.	  2012);	  S.B.	  1134,	  §	  1,	  21-­‐213(2)(b),	  62nd	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Idaho	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  5,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.B.	  20,	  118th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Ind.	  2013)	  (amending	  Ind.	  Code,	  Ch.	  10,	  §	  1);	  S.B.	  276,	  §	  80C.1-­‐1	  1,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Iowa	  2013);	  
H.B.	  410,	  §1.1	  (Iowa	  2013);	  H.B.	  427,	  §	  1.2	  (Iowa	  2013);	  H.B.	  2394,	  §	  1(a)	  (Kan.	  2013);	  H.B.	  454,	  
§	  1,	  Ch.	  500(1)(b),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ky.	  2013),	  Ky.	  14	  RS	  BR	  1,	  §	  1.(1)(b)	  (Ky.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  126th	  
Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013)	  (amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4501.1);	  H.B.	  1233,	  1-­‐203-­‐
1(A)(3),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Md.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  188th	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1357,	  §	  1	  
(Mass.	  2013)	  (amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  Gen.	  Laws	  as	  99C(c));	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  1(a)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  H.F.	  
1620,	  §	  3,	  Sub.	  1(c)	  &	  (e),	  Leg.	  (Minn.	  2013),	  S.F.	  1506,	  §	  1,	  Sub.	  1(c)	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.F.	  990,	  §	  3,	  
Subdiv.	  1.(3)	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.637.2,	  97th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mo.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  196,	  63rd	  Leg.	  (Mont.	  2013);	  Legis.	  B.	  412,	  §	  2(2),	  103rd	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Neb.	  2013);	  S.B.	  
3157,	  §	  2.a.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.J.	  2012);	  S.B.	  3929,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.J.	  2012);	  S.B.	  556,	  §	  2.B,	  51st	  
Leg.	  (N.M.	  2013);	  S.B.	  4537,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.1	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  S.B.	  6244,	  §	  1.S	  700.16,	  ¶	  1;	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  
15A-­‐232(b),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.C.	  2011);	  S.B.	  402,	  §	  716(e),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.C.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  
§	  1.1,	  63rd	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  207,	  §	  4651.50(A),	  130th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Ohio	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  54th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  1(b),	  2013	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  
2013),	  S.B.	  524,	  §	  1(1)(b)	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  71,	  §	  4(1)	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  2(1)	  (Or.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
961,	  2013	  Sess.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Pa.	  2013)	  (amending	  Ch.	  57	  of	  Tit.	  18	  of	  Pa.	  Cons.	  Stat.,	  Sub.	  
E.1.,	  §	  5776(a));	  S.B.	  875,	  §	  3	  (Pa.	  2013);	  H.B.	  Jan.	  2013	  Sess.	  (R.I.	  2013)	  (amending	  Tit.	  12	  of	  
Gen.	  L.,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3-­‐1);	  H.B.	  3415,	  120th	  Sess.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (S.C.	  2013)	  (amending	  Ch.	  13,	  
Tit.	  17	  of	  1976	  Code	  as	  17-­‐13-­‐180(A)(2));	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  B.	  395,	  §	  6-­‐39-­‐30(A));	  H.B.	  591,	  §	  
1(b)(2),	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.002(8)	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540,	  Gen.	  
Assemb.	  (Vt.	  2013)	  (amending	  §	  1	  20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  as	  §	  4622(a));	  S.B.	  16,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Vt.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  20012,	  1	  §	  1,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  2,	  63rd	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Wash.	  2013);	  S.B.	  5782,	  63rd	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wa.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐2,	  
(W.Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2948,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐3	  (W.Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐1	  (W.Va.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  196	  &	  Assemb.	  B.	  203,	  §	  2(2)	  (Wyo.	  2013);	  H.B.	  0242,	  7-­‐3-­‐1002(a)(ii)	  (Wyo.	  2013).	  	  An	  
outlier,	  the	  Arkansas	  bill,	  which	  makes	  it	  a	  crime	  to	  knowingly	  use	  a	  drone	  to	  record	  another	  
person	  or	  person’s	  property,	  specifically	  excludes	  law	  enforcement	  from	  its	  provisions.	  	  S.B.	  
1009,	  §	  1(b)(2)	  (Ark.	  2013).	  	  
8	  S.B.	  317,	  §	  1(2),	  2013	  Leg.	  (Ala.	  2013)	  (“[A]ny	  municipal,	  county,	  state,	  or	  federal	  agency	  the	  
personnel	  of	  which	  have	  (sic)	  the	  power	  of	  arrest	  and	  perform	  a	  law	  enforcement	  function.”);	  
S.B.	  1109,	  §1,	  5-­‐60-­‐106(b)(1)(A)	  –	  (B),	  89th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ark.	  2013)	  ([A]	  federal	  
agency,	  unless	  acting	  at	  the	  request	  of	  a	  state	  law	  enforcement	  officer	  or	  emergency	  
responder);	  S.B.	  200,	  §	  4(1),	  2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ga.	  2013);	  See	  also	  H.B.	  560,	  §	  2	  (Ga.	  2013)	  
(amending	  Art.	  2	  of	  Ch.	  5	  of	  Tit.	  17	  Official	  Code	  of	  Ga.	  Ann.	  as	  17-­‐5-­‐33(1)	  and	  (2))	  (“[A]	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	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which	   includes	   officers	   of	   the	   United	   States.9	   	   Others	   extend	   their	   reach	   to	  
“agents,”	  which	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  state	  authorities.10	  	  Interestingly,	  only	  nine	  bills	  
mention	   the	  U.S.	  military,	  or	  some	  component	   thereof.11	   	  Three	  of	   those	  bills	  
                                                                                                                             
enforcement	  officer	  of	  any	  department	  or	  agency	  of	  the	  United	  States	  who	  is	  regularly	  
employed	  and	  paid	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  state	  or	  any	  such	  political	  subdivision…”);	  H.B.	  
1556,	  §	  3(B)(6),	  54th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §1(2)	  (Or.	  2013);	  H.F.	  1620,	  §	  3,	  Sub	  
1(c),	  88th	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013)	  (federal	  agenc(ies)”);	  H.B.	  3415,	  120th	  Sess.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (S.C.	  
2013)	  (amending	  Ch.	  13,	  Tit.	  17	  of	  1976	  Code	  as	  17-­‐13-­‐180.(A)(2);	  H.B.	  2732,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐2,	  
2013	  Leg.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  0242,	  7-­‐3-­‐1002(a)(ii),	  2013	  Leg.	  (Wyo.	  2013)	  (including	  “federal	  
agency”	  in	  their	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  “law	  enforcement	  agency”);	  Assemb.	  B.	  3929,	  215th	  Leg.	  
Assemb.	  (N.J.	  2013)	  (“[S]tate,	  local,	  or	  interstate	  law	  enforcement	  agency”);	  	  The	  Oregon	  bill	  
specifically	  includes	  Department	  of	  Justice	  (DoJ)	  criminal	  investigators	  in	  its	  definition	  of	  law	  
enforcement.	  Two	  Massachusetts	  bills	  apply	  to	  government	  entities	  or	  officials,	  without	  
further	  definition.	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  1(1)(b)	  (Or.	  2013).	  	  S.B.	  133.525	  defines	  police	  officers	  as	  
including	  DoJ	  criminal	  investigators.	  http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/133.525.	  
9	  H.B.	  2574,	  §	  13-­‐3007.B.,	  51st	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  2(a)	  –	  (b),	  2013	  Leg.	  
(Cal.	  2013)	  (amending	  §	  1708.8	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code);	  S.B.	  783,	  §	  263B-­‐2(b),	  27th	  Leg.	  (Haw.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  1134,	  §	  1(2)(a),	  62nd	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Idaho	  2013);	  H.F.	  990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.1(b),	  88th	  Sess.	  
(Minn.	  2013);	  S.B.	  20,	  §	  4(a),	  118th	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ind.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.637.2,	  97th	  Gen.	  
Assemb.	  (Mo.	  2013);	  S.B.	  71,	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §2(2)	  (Or.	  2013);	  A.O.	  
8091,	  §	  1,	  ¶	  5,	  2013	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §2(a)(2),	  2013	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (N.C.	  2013);	  
Gen.	  Assemb.	  Sess.	  Jan.	  2013	  (R.I.	  2013)	  (amending	  Tit.	  12	  of	  Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐1);	  
H.B.	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.003(a),	  2013	  Leg.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771	  §	  6,	  63rd	  Leg.	  (Wash.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  5782,	  §	  2(6),	  63rd	  Leg.	  (Wash.	  2013);	  S.B.	  203/196,	  §	  3(2),	  2013-­‐2014	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (Wis.	  
2013).	  
10	  H.B.	  159,	  §	  13(b),	  2013	  Leg.	  (Alaska	  2013);	  S.B.	  783,	  §	  263B-­‐2(b),	  27th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Haw.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  11,	  §	  1(1)(c),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2014);	  H.B.	  207,	  §	  4651.50(A),	  130th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  
(Ohio	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  1(a),	  79th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mich.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  6244,	  §	  1,	  ¶	  1,	  
236th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  6370,	  ¶	  5(C),	  236th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  S.B.	  4537,	  §	  
52-­‐a.,	  236th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  5780,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3-­‐2(b),	  2013	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (R.I.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.002(8),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  (Tex.	  2013);	  While	  none	  of	  these	  bills	  define	  the	  
term	  “agent,”	  an	  agency	  relationship	  is	  typically	  characterized	  as	  one	  in	  which	  “a	  person	  is	  
authorized	  by	  another	  to	  act	  for	  him.”	  BLACK’S	  LAW	  DICTIONARY	  59	  (5th	  ed.	  1979).	  To	  conclusively	  
determine	  the	  parameters	  of	  an	  agency	  relationship,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  research	  applicable	  
criminal	  or	  civil	  precedent	  in	  the	  relevant	  state	  or	  federal	  forum.	  
11	  H.B.	  11,	  §	  1(4)(b),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2014).	  The	  Kentucky	  General	  Assembly	  proposed	  a	  bill	  that	  
would	  permit	  the	  “U.S.	  Armed	  Forces”	  stationed	  in	  the	  State	  to	  “use	  drones	  for	  purposes	  of	  
training”;	  	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  5.C.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  of	  54th	  Leg.,	  (Okla.	  2013).	  The	  Oklahoma	  bill,	  which	  
was	  held	  over	  until	  next	  session	  and	  replaced	  with	  a	  call	  for	  an	  interim	  study	  on	  drone	  privacy	  
issues,	  specifically	  permitted	  the	  “United	  States	  military”	  to	  operate	  “weaponized”	  drones	  over	  
public	  land	  for	  purposes	  of	  testing	  and	  training;	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  2	  and	  9(c),	  63rd	  Leg.,	  (Wash.	  
2013).	  This	  would	  exclude	  application	  of	  its	  prohibitions	  to	  the	  “Washington	  National	  Guard	  in	  
title	  (sic)	  32	  U.S.C.	  status	  ”	  and	  permit	  training	  exercises	  “conducted	  on	  a	  military	  base….”	  
where	  the	  drone	  “does	  not	  collect	  personal	  information	  on	  persons	  located	  outside	  the	  
military	  base”;	  	  Assemb.	  B.	  3157,	  ¶	  5.,	  215th	  Leg.,	  (N.J.	  2013).	  The	  New	  Jersey	  proposal,	  which	  
would	  make	  the	  purchase,	  ownership	  or	  possession	  of	  a	  drone	  a	  “disorderly	  persons	  offense,”	  
exempts	  “any	  member	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States	  or	  member	  of	  the	  National	  
2013]	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have	  become	  law.12	  
	   Bills	  that	  prohibit	  use	  of	  “weaponized”	  drones	  would	  also	  seemingly	  
apply	  to	  the	  DoD,	  unless	  exempted.13	  	  The	  state	  proposals	  that	  overtly	  address	  
the	  U.S.	  military	  have	  applicability	  language	  so	  broad	  that	  could	  be	  interpreted	  
to	  include	  military	  use.	  	  If	  so,	  those	  proposals	  could	  have	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  
military	  training,	  operations	  and	  combat	  readiness.	  	  Specifically,	  about	  one-­‐
third	  of	  the	  drone	  restriction	  bills	  are	  ambiguous	  enough	  to	  implicate	  the	  DoD.	  	  
Several	  bills,	  which	  purport	  to	  apply	  to	  those	  acting	  under	  state	  authority,	  may	  
apply	  to	  the	  National	  Guard	  in	  Title	  32	  or	  State	  Active	  Duty	  (SAD)	  status.14	  	  As	  
discussed	  above,	  state	  bills	  that	  apply	  to	  any	  “person”	  or	  “entity,”	  could	  apply	  
to	  DoD	  officials,	  employees	  or	  personnel.15	  	  The	  same	  logic	  applies	  to	  bills	  that	  
                                                                                                                             
Guard	  while	  on	  duty	  or	  traveling	  to	  or	  from	  an	  authorized	  place	  of	  duty.”;	  S.B.	  875,	  §	  5(1)-­‐(3),	  
197th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Pa.	  2013).	  The	  Pennsylvania	  Senate	  Bill,	  which	  remains	  in	  committee,	  
exempts	  its	  National	  Guard.;	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.639(2),	  97th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  First	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Mo.	  
2013),	  The	  Missouri	  bill	  permits	  higher	  education	  institutes	  to	  conduct	  educational,	  research	  or	  
training	  programs	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  DoD.;	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  12(1),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  (Or.	  
2013).	  Finally,	  a	  draft	  Oregon	  bill,	  would	  have	  excluded	  “the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  
States…or	  any	  component	  of	  the	  Oregon	  National	  Guard	  from	  using	  drones	  during	  a	  drill,	  
training	  exercise	  or	  disaster	  response.”	  
12	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  16,	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  (Or.	  2013).	  The	  Oregon	  law	  explicitly	  exempts	  the	  
“Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  from	  its	  provisions.	  	  The	  law	  references	  ORS	  351.642,	  
which	  defines	  “Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  as	  including:	  	  (A)	  The	  Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  
Marine	  Corps	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  (B)	  Reserve	  components	  of	  the	  Army,	  
Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  Marine	  Corps	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  and	  (C)	  The	  National	  
Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Oregon	  National	  Guard.;	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.002(3),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  
(Tex.	  2013).	  The	  Texas	  law	  contains	  a	  lengthy	  “non-­‐applicability”	  section	  which	  excludes	  drone	  
use	  that	  is,	  “part	  of	  an	  operation,	  exercise,	  or	  mission	  of	  any	  branch	  of	  the	  United	  States	  
military.”;	  H.B.	  2012,	  ¶	  1,	  §	  1,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Va.	  2013),	  The	  Virginia	  bill,	  which	  was	  approved	  
on	  April	  3,	  2013,	  contains	  verbatim	  language	  of	  a	  Pennsylvania	  Senate	  Bill:	  S.B.	  875,	  §	  5(1)-­‐(3),	  
197th	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Pa.	  2013),	  which	  exempts	  its	  National	  Guard	  from	  prohibitions	  on	  drone	  
use	  before	  2015.	  Both	  state,	  “The	  prohibitions	  in	  this	  section	  shall	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  (State)	  
National	  Guard	  while	  utilizing	  unmanned	  aircraft	  systems	  during	  training	  required	  to	  maintain	  
readiness	  for	  its	  federal	  mission,	  when	  facilitating	  training	  for	  other	  United	  States	  Department	  
of	  Defense	  units,	  or	  when	  such	  systems	  are	  utilized	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  for	  purposes	  other	  
than	  law	  enforcement,	  including	  damage	  assessment,	  traffic	  assessment,	  flood	  stages,	  and	  
wildfire	  assessment…”	  	  	  
13	  States	  containing	  a	  ban	  against	  use	  of	  weaponized	  drones,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  federal	  
pre-­‐emption,	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
14	  “Title	  32”	  status	  is	  usually	  a	  “training”	  status,	  where	  the	  federal	  government	  provides	  
training	  funds	  to	  National	  Guard	  units.	  
15	  S.B.	  1134,	  §	  21-­‐213,	  ¶	  (2)(a),	  62nd	  Idaho	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Idaho	  2013).	  Idaho	  applies	  their	  
restrictions	  to	  any	  “entity”	  (undefined)	  or	  “person”	  using	  a	  drone	  to	  conduct	  surveillance.	  	  S.B.	  
1664,	  §	  99C,	  ¶	  (c),	  188th	  Gen.	  Ct.,	  (Mass.	  2013).	  The	  Massachusetts	  proposal	  applies	  to	  
government	  entities	  or	  officials,	  but	  does	  not	  define	  the	  term.	  See	  	  S.B.	  20,	  Chap.	  10,	  §	  4,	  118th	  
Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Ind.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.637,	  97th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Mo.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.002,	  (Tex.	  2013).	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  2,	  ¶	  (6)	  and	  §	  13,	  (Wash.	  2013).	  These	  bills	  apply	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extend	  their	  reach	  to	  “agents”	  of	  state	  law	  enforcement.16	  	  	  
B. Drone	  Prohibitions	  and	  Exceptions	  
	   Restrictive	   state	   legislative	   proposals	   will	   have	   unintended	   consequences.	  	  
To	   preemptively	   rein	   in	   potential	   government	   overreach,	   most	   states	   have	  
proposed	   legislation	   that	   forbids	   government	   officials	   from	   using	   drones	   to	  
collect	   information	  or	  evidence	  without	  a	  warrant.	   	  However,	  many	  proposals	  
selectively	  apply	  the	  judicially	  accepted	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement.	  
For	   this	   and	   other	   reasons,	   these	   proposals	   will	   have	   significant	   second	   and	  
third	   order	   effects	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   our	   greater	   society,	   including	   eroding	  
long-­‐standing	  Fourth	  Amendment	  jurisprudence.	  	  	  
	   Almost	  universally,	  state	  drone	  bills	  prohibit	  drone	  users	  from	  collecting	  or	  
receiving	  “information	  and	  evidence”	  on	  persons	  within	  that	  State.17	  	  There	  are	  
                                                                                                                             
to	  any	  “person”	  operating	  a	  drone,	  and	  the	  Wash.	  bill	  defines	  a	  “person”	  broadly	  as	  “any	  
individual,	  corporation,	  partnership,	  association,	  cooperative,	  limited	  liability	  company,	  trust,	  
joint	  venture,	  government,	  political	  subdivision	  or	  any	  other	  legal	  or	  commercial	  entity	  and	  any	  
successor,	  representative,	  agent,	  agency	  or	  instrumentality	  thereof.”	  
16	  An	  agency	  relationship	  between	  the	  DoD	  and	  State	  or	  local	  governments	  could	  occur	  during	  
a	  Defense	  Support	  for	  Civil	  Authorities	  (DSCA)	  operation,	  such	  as	  assisting	  law	  enforcement	  or	  
during	  disaster	  relief.	  
17	  S.	  B.	  317,	  §	  1(b)(1),	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ala.	  2013);	  H.B.	  159a,	  28th	  Leg.,	  (Alaska	  2013).	  
Amending	  §	  4.;	  H.B.	  2574,	  51st	  Leg.,	  First	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Ariz.	  2013).	  Amending	  §	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  
ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  A.;	  H.B.	  1904,	  (Ark.	  2013).	  Amending	  AR	  Code	  Title	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐104(a).;	  S.B.	  
15,	  Title	  14,	  §	  14352(a),	  2013-­‐2014	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Cal.	  2013)	  and	  Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  
14350(a),	  2013-­‐2014	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Cal.	  2013);	  	  S.B.	  92,	  §	  1(3),	  115th	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Fla.	  2013);	  S.B.	  
200,	  §	  5(b),	  152nd	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Ga.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1134,	  §	  1.,21-­‐213(2)(a),	  62nd	  Idaho	  Leg.,	  1st	  
Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Idaho	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  10,	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.B.	  20,	  (Ind.	  2013).	  Amending	  Ind.	  Code,	  
Ch.	  10,	  Sec	  4(a);	  H.	  File	  410,	  §1.1.,	  85th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Iowa	  2013)	  and	  H.	  File	  427,	  §1.2.,	  85th	  
Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Iowa	  2013);	  H.B.	  2394	  §	  1(a),	  85th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Kan.	  2013);	  H.B.	  454,	  §	  1	  of	  
KRS	  Ch.	  500(2),	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  11,	  §	  1(4)(b),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2014);	  S.	  Paper	  
72,	  126th	  Leg.,	  (Me.	  2013).	  Amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4502.2.;	  H.B.	  1233,	  1-­‐203-­‐1(B)(1),	  
433rd	  Sess.	  of	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Md.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1,	  188th	  Gen.	  Ct.	  (Ma.	  2013).	  Amending	  
Ch.	  272	  of	  Gen.	  Laws	  as	  99C(c);	  H.B.	  1357,	  188th	  Gen.	  Ct.	  (Ma.	  2013);	  H.	  B.	  4455,	  §	  3(3);	  H.	  File	  
990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.2,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  88th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (Minn.	  2013)	  and	  S.	  File	  1506,	  §	  1,	  Sub	  2.,	  1st	  
Reg.	  Sess.,	  88th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.637.2,	  97th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  
Sess.,	  (Mo.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196,	  §	  1(1),	  63rd	  Leg.,	  (Mont.	  2013);	  Leg.	  B.	  412,	  §	  (3),	  103rd	  Leg.,	  (Neb.	  
2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  3157,	  §2.b.,	  215th	  Leg.,	  (N.J.	  2013)	  and	  Assemb.	  B.	  3929,	  §	  1.b.	  215th	  Leg.	  
(N.J.	  2013);	  S.B.	  556,	  §	  3.A.	  -­‐	  B.,	  51st	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (N.M.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  6244,	  §	  1.	  S	  700.16,	  ¶	  
1,	  236th	  Leg.,	  (N.Y.	  2013),	  Assemb.	  B.	  6541,	  Sec	  66-­‐A.2,	  236th	  Leg.;	  (N.Y.	  2013),	  and	  S.B.	  4537	  §	  
1,	  S52-­‐A.1,	  236th	  Leg.,	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  2.1.,	  63rd	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  207,	  §	  
4561.50(A),	  130th	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (Ohio	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  3.A.,	  54th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Okla.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  3.(1),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  (Or.	  2013),	  S.B.	  524,	  §1(2),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (Or.	  
2013),	  S.B.	  71,	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  (Or.	  2013),	  and	  S.B.	  853	  §	  2(1),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (Or.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  961,	  Subch.	  E.1.,	  §	  5776	  (a),	  197th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Pa.	  2013).	  Amending	  Ch.	  57	  of	  Title	  18	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a	   few	   outliers.	   	   New	   Hampshire	   for	   example,	   specifically	   provides	   that	  
legislation	   will	   “not...	   impair	   or	   limit	   otherwise	   lawful	   activities	   of	   law	  
enforcement	   personnel…”18	   	   Additionally,	   one	   Arkansas	   bill	   exempts	   law	  
enforcement	   officers	   and	   emergency	   responders	   operating	   drones	   as	   part	   of	  
their	   official	   job	   duties.19	   	   Similar	   bills	   in	   Michigan	   and	   North	   Carolina	   allow	  
drone	  use	  for	  purposes	  other	  than	  intelligence	  or	  law	  enforcement.20	  
	   Despite	  the	  general	  rule	  prohibiting	  drone	  use	  to	  collect	  information,	  most	  
state	  legislation	  contains	  exceptions	  that	  allow	  drone	  use	  for	  limited	  purposes.	  	  
The	  most	  common	  exceptions	  occur	  when	  law	  enforcement	  obtains	  a	  judicial	  or	  
court	   order,	   a	   basic	   Fourth	   Amendment	   tenant.21	   	   Indiana,	   Nebraska,	   New	  
Jersey	  and	  West	  Virginia,	  however,	  have	  all	  proposed	  bills	  that	  fail	  to	  include	  a	  
warrant	   exception,	   a	   minority	   view,	   which	   is	   more	   stringent	   than	   the	  
Constitution	  would	  perhaps	  allow.22	  
	   Other	   common	   exceptions	   that	   allow	   the	   robust	   use	   of	   drones	   include	  
imminent	  danger	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  life	  and	  property.	  	  Nineteen	  bills	  permit	  
drone	  use	  in	  circumstances	  where	  there	  is	  a	  credible	  and	  high	  risk	  of	  a	  terrorist	  
attack.23	  	  Bills	  from	  West	  Virginia	  and	  Kansas	  for	  example,	  would	  allow	  drones	  
                                                                                                                             
of	  PA	  Cons.	  Stat.;	  S.B.	  411,	  2013	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (R.I.	  2013).	  Amending	  Title	  12	  of	  General	  Laws,	  Ch.	  
5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.	  and	  R.I.	  LC00564,	  §	  1,	  §	  12-­‐5.3-­‐2(a);	  H.B.	  3415,	  120th	  Sess.,	  (S.C.	  2013).	  
Amending	  Ch.	  13,	  Title	  17	  of	  1976	  Code	  as	  17-­‐13-­‐180.(b);	  S.B.	  395,	  §	  1.,	  Ch.	  39,	  §	  6-­‐39-­‐30(A),	  
120th	  Sess.,	  (S.C.	  2013);	  H.B.	  591,	  §	  1(c),	  108th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  
§	  423.003(a),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540,	  2013-­‐2014	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  (Vt.	  2013).	  Amending	  §	  1	  
20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  as,	  §	  4622(a);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  3.,	  63rd	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Wash.	  2013)	  and	  
S.B.	  5782,	  §	  3,	  63rd	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Wash.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732,	  81st	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  
(W.Va.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  2948,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐3,	  81st	  Leg.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (W.Va.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196	  
and	  Assemb.	  B.	  203,	  §	  2,	  175.55(2),	  101st	  Leg.,	  (Wis.	  2013);	  H.B.	  242,	  §	  7-­‐3-­‐1003,	  62nd	  Leg.,	  
(Wyo.	  2013);	  See	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  5,	  ¶(e),	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  (Mich.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  2(b),	  
2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (N.C.	  2013).	  States	  that	  specifically	  allow	  drone	  use	  if	  not	  for	  an	  
intelligence	  or	  law	  enforcement	  purpose.	  See	  S.	  File	  276,	  80C.1.,	  85th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Iowa	  
2013);	  S.B.	  875,	  §	  3,	  197th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  (Pa.	  2013),	  and	  H.B.	  2012,	  1.	  §	  1.,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  
(Va.	  2013).	  States	  that	  prohibit	  drone	  use,	  with	  limited	  exceptions,	  prior	  to	  July	  1,	  2015.	  	  
18	  NH	  HB	  619,	  §	  2,	  2013	  Sess.	  (N.H.	  2013).	  
19	  S.B.	  1109,	  §	  1,	  5-­‐60-­‐3(b)(1)(A)-­‐(B)	  (Ark.	  2013).	  
20	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  5	  ¶	  (e.),	  2013	  H.R.	  (Mich.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  2(b),	  2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.C.	  
2013).¶	  
21	  Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  347,	  351	  (1967).	  
22	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  Indiana	  bill	  is	  obtaining	  consent.	  S.B.	  20,	  118th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(In.	  2013).	  	  The	  NE	  bill	  prohibits	  law	  enforcement	  from	  using	  a	  drone	  to	  gather	  evidence	  and	  
does	  not	  contain	  a	  warrant	  exception.	  	  It	  does,	  however,	  include	  a	  “terrorist	  attack”	  exception.	  	  
Leg.	  B.	  412,	  §	  4,	  103rd	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Ne.	  2013).	  	  Although	  neither	  New	  Jersey	  nor	  West	  
Virginia	  contain	  a	  warrant	  exception,	  they	  both	  permit	  drone	  use	  for	  terrorist	  attacks.	  	  NJ	  also	  
permits	  use	  during	  disasters	  or	  emergencies.	  	  Assemb.	  B.	  3929,	  215th	  Leg.	  (N.J.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
2948,	  81st	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).	  	  	  
23	  All	  bills	  that	  contain	  a	  “terrorist	  attack”	  exception	  use	  similar	  language,	  “To	  counter	  a	  high	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to	   be	   used	   for	   purposes	   of	   an	   “imminent	   terrorist	   attack,”	   but	   only	   after	  
obtaining	   a	   warrant.24	   	   This	   too,	   flies	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
jurisprudence	  insofar	  as	  exigent	  circumstances	  constituting	  an	  imminent	  danger	  
to	  life	  are	  a	  judicially	  recognized	  exception	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement.25	  
	   Whether	   express	  or	   implied,	   and	   consistent	  with	   Fourth	  Amendment	   law,	  
most	  state	  bills	  would	  permit	  drone	  use	  to	  save	  lives	  in	  emergency	  situations.26	  	  
Seventy-­‐two	   bills	   contain	   an	   explicit	   “imminent	   danger	   to	   life”	   exception.27	  	  
                                                                                                                             
risk	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  by	  a	  specific	  individual	  or	  organization	  if	  the	  United	  States	  Secretary	  of	  
Homeland	  Security…determines	  that	  credible	  intelligence	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  risk.”	  	  
See	  AL	  SB	  317,	  §	  1(b)(2)(a);	  FL	  SB	  92,	  §	  1(4)(a);	  IA	  HF	  427,	  §	  1.3.(a);	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  15(1);	  KS	  HB	  
2394,	  §	  1(c);	  KY	  HB	  454,	  §	  1	  of	  KRS	  Ch.	  500,	  §	  1.(1)(3)(a);	  MD	  HB	  1233,	  1-­‐203-­‐1(B)(2)(I);	  MN	  SF	  
1506,	  §	  1,	  Sub	  3.	  (1)	  and	  MN	  HF	  990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.4(4);	  NE	  LB	  412,	  §	  (4);	  NJ	  AB	  3929,	  ¶	  1.c.;	  	  NY	  	  
AO	  6370/	  SO	  4537,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A..3.A.(4);	  	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(A)(1);	  	  SC	  HB	  3415,	  amending	  
Ch.	  13,	  Title	  17	  of	  1976	  Code	  as	  17-­‐13-­‐180.(B)(1);	  TN	  HB	  591,	  §	  1(d)(1);	  WV	  HB	  2732,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐
7-­‐4,	  WV	  HB	  2948,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐4;	  and	  WY	  HB	  0242,	  7-­‐3-­‐1004(a)(ii).ME	  SP	  72,	  §	  4503.1.A.(1)-­‐(2)	  
contains	  an	  emergency	  enforcement	  exception	  for	  threats	  to	  national,	  state	  or	  local	  security.	  	  
KS	  HB	  2394,	  §	  1(c)	  and	  WV	  HB	  2732,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐4	  require	  a	  warrant	  to	  use	  a	  drone	  in	  terrorist	  attack	  
scenarios.	  
24	  See	  H.B.	  2394,	  §	  1(c)	  (Kan.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐4,	  81st	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).	  
25	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  Hampshire,	  403	  U.S.	  443,	  474-­‐75	  (1920)(“[I]t	  is	  accepted,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  principle,	  that	  a	  search	  or	  seizure	  carried	  out	  on	  a	  suspect’s	  premises	  without	  a	  
warrant	  is	  per	  se	  unreasonable,	  unless	  the	  police	  can	  show	  that	  it	  falls	  within	  one	  of	  a	  carefully	  
defined	  set	  of	  exceptions	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘exigent	  circumstances’”).	  	  
26	  Warden,	  Maryland	  Penitentiary	  v.	  Hayden,	  387	  U.S.	  294,	  298-­‐99	  (1967)(“The	  Fourth	  
Amendment	  does	  not	  require	  police	  officers	  to	  delay	  in	  the	  course	  of	  an	  investigation	  if	  to	  do	  
so	  would	  gravely	  endanger	  their	  lives	  or	  the	  lives	  of	  others.”).	  
27	  For	  “danger	  to	  life”	  exceptions,	  see	  S.B.	  317,	  §	  1(b)(2)(c),	  2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ala.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  1904,	  89th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ark.	  2013);	  A.B.	  1327,	  §1,	  Title	  14,	  §14550(c)(1),	  	  
2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013-­‐14);	  Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14352,	  2013-­‐14	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  
Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  92	  §	  1(4)(c),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Fla.	  2013);	  ¶S.B.	  200,	  §	  5(e)(1)	  (Ga.	  2013);	  S.B.	  
2563B-­‐4(1)(A)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1134,	  §21-­‐213(2),	  62nd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Idaho	  2013);	  S.B.	  
1587,	  §15(5),	  98th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.B.	  276	  §	  2.c.	  (Iowa	  2013)	  and	  H.F.	  410,	  
§	  3.c.	  (Iowa	  2013);	  H.B.	  454,	  §	  1,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  
4503.1(A)(3),	  126th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1233,	  §	  1-­‐203-­‐1(B)(2)(II),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Md.	  
2013);	  H.F.	  1506,	  §	  1(4),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  S.F.	  1620,	  §	  3(5),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  
Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.F.	  990,	  §	  1(6)(b),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.639.1,	  
97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mo.	  2013);	  A.O.	  3157,	  ¶	  1.d.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.J.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6370,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐
A.1.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐A.3.(B),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  3.2,	  63d	  
Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  207,	  §	  4561.50(A)(3),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ohio	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  
3.B.3,	  54th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  1(2)(b),	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  RI	  
Gen.	  Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013,	  amending	  title	  12	  of	  Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(f)(1);	  	  H.B.	  3415,	  §	  
2(c),	  120th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (S.C.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  591,	  §	  1(e),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  
423.002(a)(12),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540,	  amending	  §	  1.20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
1771,	  §	  9(1)(a),	  63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wash.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐3(a),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  196,	  §	  2,	  175.55(s),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wis.	  2013).¶	  H.B.	  619	  (N.H.	  2013)does	  not	  contain	  
an	  explicit	  “danger	  to	  life”	  exception	  but	  its	  bill	  was	  written	  so	  as	  not	  to	  be	  “construed	  to	  
impair	  or	  limit	  any	  otherwise	  lawful	  activities	  of	  law	  enforcement	  personnel”	  See	  §2.V.	  	  Even	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Drones	  at	  Home	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Sixteen	   bills	   allow	   drone	   use	   for	   disaster	   response,	   whether	   natural	   or	  man-­‐
made.28	   	  A	   slightly	   fewer	  number,	   about	   fourteen,	   expressly	  delineate	   Search	  
and	  Rescue	  (SAR)	  operations	  as	  a	  drone	  use	  exception.29	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  
bills	  from	  Iowa,	  Pennsylvania	  and	  Virginia	  contain	  exceptions	  that	  would	  allow	  
drone	  use	  in	  support	  of	  “Amber”	  or	  similar	  missing	  person	  alerts.30	  
	   Eighteen	   bills	   include	   a	   provision	   to	   allow	   drone	   use	   to	   protect	   property	  
from	  damage.31	  	  Protection	  of	  property,	  is	  also	  arguably	  inherent	  in	  drone	  use	  
exceptions	   relating	   to	   disasters,	   firefighting,	   terrorist	   attacks,	   or	   emergency	  
services.32	  
	   Other,	  less	  common	  drone	  use	  exceptions,	  relate	  to	  circumstances	  evoking	  
judicially	  recognized	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement.33	  	  In	  fact,	  only	  five	  
                                                                                                                             
though	  the	  following	  do	  not	  contain	  an	  explicit	  “danger	  to	  life”	  exceptions,	  other	  provisions	  
would	  fairly	  embrace	  it:	  	  S.B.	  1109	  (Ark.	  2013)	  (permits	  law	  enforcement	  to	  use	  drones	  for	  any	  
purpose)	  and	  A.O.	  6244	  (N.Y.	  2013)	  (permits	  lawful	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement).	  
Only	  fourteen	  bills	  do	  not	  include	  such	  language:	  H.B.	  159a	  (Alaska	  2013);	  H.B.	  2574	  (Ariz.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  560	  (Ga.	  2013),	  S.B.	  20	  (Ind.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2394	  (Kan.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196	  (Mont.	  2013);	  
L.B.	  412	  (Neb.	  2013);	  	  A.B.	  3157	  (N.J.	  2013);	  S.B.	  71	  (Or.	  2013),	  H.B.	  961	  (Pa.	  2013),	  RI	  LC00564,	  
Gen.	  Assemb.	  395	  (S.C.	  2013),	  H.B.	  2732	  (R.I.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  2948	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).	  
28	  Disaster	  response	  clauses	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  CA	  Assembly	  Bill	  1327,	  §	  14350(c)(1)	  and	  (e)(1)-­‐
(2);	  GA	  SB	  200	  §	  5,	  ¶	  (e)(2);	  	  IA	  SF	  276;	  ME	  SP	  72,	  §	  4503.2.(A),	  (B),	  (D);	  	  MN	  HF	  1620	  §	  3,	  Sub.	  4	  
¶	  (4)	  and	  MN	  HF	  440,	  §	  3,	  Subd.4(6);	  	  ND	  HB	  1373	  §	  3,	  ¶	  3;NJ	  Assembly	  No.	  3157,	  ¶	  4	  and	  NJ	  
AB	  3929,	  §1.d.;	  OK	  HB	  1556,	  §3.B.4.;	  	  OR	  HB	  2710,	  §	  5(3)	  and	  OR	  SB	  853,	  §	  8(1);	  	  TX	  HB	  912,	  §	  
423.001(c)(3);	  PA	  SB	  85,	  §	  5(3)	  	  and	  VA	  HB	  2012,	  1.	  §	  1;	  and	  WV	  HB	  2997,	  Sec	  1-­‐7-­‐3(b).	  
29	  For	  SAR	  clauses,	  see	  CA	  AB	  1327	  §	  14350,	  ¶	  (c)(1);	  FL	  SB	  92	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (4)(c);	  	  ID	  SB	  1134,	  §	  21-­‐
213,	  ¶	  (2);	  	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  15(4);	  	  IA	  SB	  276	  §	  12	  and	  IA	  HF	  410,	  §	  2.c.;	  ME	  SP	  72,	  §	  4503.2.E.;	  OK	  
HB	  1556	  §	  3.3;	  OR	  HB	  2710,	  §	  5(1);	  	  PA	  SB	  875,	  §4;	  TN	  SB	  796,	  §1(d)(5);	  	  TX	  HB	  912	  §	  
423.002(8)(D);	  VA	  H	  2012	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (iv)	  and	  WI	  SB	  196/AB	  203,	  §2(2).Of	  these,	  some	  require	  an	  
imminent	  danger	  to	  life	  before	  a	  drone	  can	  be	  used	  for	  SAR:	  	  CA	  AB	  1327	  §	  14350,	  ¶	  (c)(1);	  IA	  
HF	  410,	  Sec	  2.c.;	  OK	  HB	  1556,	  §	  3.B.3.	  ;PA	  SB	  875,	  §	  4;	  VA	  H	  2012	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (iv).	  
30	  IA	  SF	  276	  and	  IA	  HF	  410,	  §	  2.b.;	  	  PA	  SB	  875,	  §4;	  	  and	  VA	  HB	  2012,	  §	  1,	  ¶	  1.	  Even	  where	  such	  
specialized	  carve	  outs	  for	  imminent	  terrorist	  attacks,	  SAR,	  Amber	  or	  similar	  alerts	  and/or	  
response	  to	  natural	  disasters	  do	  not	  exist,	  a	  plausible	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  such	  
situations	  would	  qualify	  under	  a	  State’s	  more	  general	  provisions	  permitting	  drone	  use	  to	  
alleviate	  danger	  to	  life.	  
31	  Danger	  to	  property	  provisions	  include:	  	  CA	  AB	  1327	  §	  14350,	  ¶	  (d)(2);	  FL	  SB	  92	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (4)(c);	  	  
GA	  SB	  200	  §	  5(e)(2);	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  15,	  ¶	  (3);	  IA	  SB	  276	  §	  11,	  ¶	  (b),	  IA	  HF	  410,	  §1.2.c.,	  and	  IA	  HF	  
427,	  §1.2.c.;	  KY	  HB	  454	  §	  1,	  ¶	  3(c);	  MD	  HB	  1233	  §	  1-­‐203,	  ¶	  (B)(II);	  MN	  HF	  1620	  §	  3,	  Sub,	  4,	  ¶	  (3)	  
and	  MN	  HF	  990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.4(5);	  NC	  HB	  312	  §	  2(c)(3);	  ND	  HB	  1373	  §	  3.3.;	  	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  
4561.50(A)(3);	  	  SC	  H3415	  §	  2,	  ¶	  (B)(3);	  	  OR	  HB	  853,	  §8(1);	  	  PA	  SB	  875,	  §	  4;	  	  and	  TX	  HB	  912	  §	  
423.002.	  	  
32	  See	  supra	  notes	  26-­‐28	  &	  31.	  
33	  See	  supra	  note	  24.	  See	  also	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  Hampshire,	  403	  U.S.	  443,	  474-­‐75	  (1920)(“[I]t	  is	  
accepted,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  that	  a	  search	  or	  seizure	  carried	  out	  on	  a	  suspect’s	  
premises	  without	  a	  warrant	  is	  per	  se	  unreasonable,	  unless	  the	  police	  can	  show	  that	  it	  falls	  
within	  one	  of	  a	  carefully	  defined	  set	  of	  exceptions	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘exigent	  
circumstances’”);	  	  Schmerber	  v.	  California,	  384	  U.S.	  757	  (1966);	  consent,	  Schneckloth	  v.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	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  IV	  58	  
states	  explicitly	   codify	   such	  an	  exception,	  meaning	   that	  all	  other	   states	  either	  
ignore	   or	   only	   partially	   recognize	   these	   existing	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
jurisprudential	  exceptions.34	  	  For	  example,	  even	  though	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  
determined	  that	  a	  consensual	  search	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  
less	  than	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  bills	  surveyed	  expressly	  permit	  drone	  use	  where	  the	  
individual	  has	  consented.35	   	  Similarly,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  
held	   exigent	   circumstances	   exist	   when	   a	   felon	   or	   suspect	   is	   fleeing	   and	  
destruction	  of	  evidence	  is	  imminent,	  only	  sixteen	  bills	  include	  a	  “fleeing	  felon”	  
exception	   and	   even	   fewer	   provide	   a	   carve-­‐out	   to	   prevent	   the	   destruction	   of	  
evidence.36	  
	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   small	   number	   of	   states	   would	   permit	   drone	   use	   in	  
support	  of	  particular	   investigations	   in	  a	  manner	  that,	  arguably,	   ignores	  Fourth	  
                                                                                                                             
Bustamonte,	  412	  U.S.	  218	  (1973)	  and	  for	  plain	  view	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  aerial	  surveillance,	  
California	  v.	  Ciraolo,	  476	  U.S.	  207,	  213	  (1986);	  Florida	  v.	  Riley,	  488	  U.S.	  445,	  448	  (1989).	  
34	  AK	  HB	  159a,	  amending	  §	  2(b)(2);CA	  Senate	  Bill	  No.	  15,	  §	  5	  amending	  14352	  of	  Penal	  code,	  ¶	  
(b);	  	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  30;	  	  MT	  SB	  196,	  §	  1(1)(b);	  NY	  AO	  6244,	  §	  1.1;	  and	  TN	  SB	  796,	  §1(g)(2).	  
35	  Schmerber	  v.	  California,	  384	  U.S.	  757	  (1966).	  	  Bills	  with	  consent	  provisions	  include:	  AK	  HB	  
159a,	  amending	  §	  2(b)(4);	  	  AZ	  	  HB	  2574,	  amending	  §	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  D.2.;AR	  	  
HB1904,	  amending	  AR	  Code	  Title	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐104(a)(1);	  HI	  SB,	  263B-­‐2(c)(1);ID	  SB	  1134,	  §	  
1.,21-­‐213(2)(a)(i)-­‐(ii);	  	  IL	  SB	  1586,	  §	  15(5);	  IN	  SB	  20,	  §	  4(a);	  	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  
12,	  §	  4502.2.	  (B);MA	  SB	  1664,	  §	  1(e);	  MI	  HB	  4455,	  §	  5(a);MN	  HF	  1620/	  1706,	  §	  2,	  Sub	  2.;MO	  HB	  
46,	  §	  305.637.2.;	  	  NM	  SB	  556,	  §	  3.A.;	  ND	  HB	  1373,	  §	  4.2.;OK	  HB	  1556,	  §	  3.B.5;	  OR	  HB	  2710,	  §	  4	  
and	  SB	  853,	  §	  5;and	  TX	  HB	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.002(6).	  	  Consent	  would	  presumably	  be	  implied	  
for	  State	  bills	  containing	  a	  proviso	  allowing	  drone	  use	  in	  accordance	  with	  judicially	  recognized	  
exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement.	  	  MA	  and	  NY	  bills	  contain	  provisions	  that	  only	  permit	  
dissemination	  or	  receipt	  of	  information	  with	  the	  individual’s	  consent.	  	  MA	  SB	  1664/BH	  1357,	  §	  
99-­‐C(e)	  and	  NYAO	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐A.3.(A).	  
36	  Tennessee	  v.	  Garner,	  471	  U.S.	  1	  (1985)	  (law	  enforcement	  may	  us	  non-­‐lethal	  force	  to	  deter	  a	  
fleeing	  felon);	  	  Roaden	  v.	  Kentucky,	  413	  U.S.	  496,	  505	  (1973)	  (“Where	  there	  are	  exigent	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  police	  action	  literally	  must	  be	  ‘now	  or	  never’	  to	  preserve	  the	  evidence	  
of	  the	  crime,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  permit	  action	  without	  prior	  judicial	  evaluation”).“Fleeing	  felon”	  
language	  is	  included	  in	  the	  following	  bills:	  AL	  SB	  317	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (a)2(c);	  	  CA	  AB	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  §	  
14350(c)	  and	  CA	  HB	  No.	  15,	  amending	  penal	  code	  §	  14352(b);	  	  FL	  SB	  92	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (4)(c);	  IL	  SB	  1587	  
§	  15	  (3);	  KY	  HB	  454	  §1,	  ¶	  3(c);	  	  IA	  HF	  427,	  §	  1.3.c.;	  	  MN	  HB	  1620	  §	  1,	  Sub.	  3	  and	  MN	  HF	  990,	  §	  3,	  
Subd.4(5)(iii);	  NC	  HB	  312	  §	  2,	  ¶	  (c)(3)(iii);	  	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(A)(3);	  	  SC	  H	  3415	  §	  2,	  ¶	  
(B)(3);TN	  SB	  796,	  §	  1(d)(4);	  	  TX	  HB	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.002(8)(A);	  	  WI	  SB	  196/AB	  203,	  §	  2,	  
175.55(2);	  	  WY	  HB	  242	  §	  1,	  ¶	  7-­‐3-­‐1004(a)(iv).	  	  Depending	  on	  interpretation,	  the	  following	  
additional	  State	  bills	  may	  apply	  to	  fleeing	  suspects:	  	  CA	  AB	  1327	  §	  14350,	  ¶	  (c);	  ID	  SB	  1134	  §	  1,	  
¶	  21-­‐213(2);	  MD	  HB	  1233	  §	  1-­‐203.1(B)(2)(II);	  and	  ND	  HB	  1373	  §	  3,	  ¶	  3.States	  that	  include	  the	  
“destruction	  of	  evidence”	  exception	  for	  drones	  all	  use	  the	  same	  language,	  “to	  forestall	  (or	  
prevent)…	  the	  destruction	  of	  evidence.”See	  FL	  SB	  92,	  §	  1(3)(c);	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  15(3);	  IA	  HF	  427,	  §	  
1.3.c.;	  KY	  HB	  454,	  §	  1(3)(c);	  MN	  HF	  1620/	  1706	  §	  3,	  Sub.	  4(3)	  and	  MN	  HF	  990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.4(5)(iv)	  
;	  ND	  HB	  1373,	  §	  2.(c)(3)(iv)	  (adds	  the	  qualifier	  “imminent”);	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(A)(3);	  SC	  H	  
3415,	  §	  2.(B)(3)	  and	  WI	  SB	  196/AB	  203,	  §	  2,	  175.55(2).	  
36	  AK	  HB	  159a,	  amending	  §	  2(b)(2);CA	  Senate	  Bill	  No.	  15,	  §	  5	  amending	  14352	  of	  Penal	  code,	  ¶	  
(b);	  	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  30;	  	  MT	  SB	  196,	  §	  1(1)(b);	  NY	  AO	  6244,	  §	  1.1;	  and	  TN	  SB	  796,	  §1(g)(2).	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Amendment	   principles.	   	   Arkansas,	   Hawaii,	   Maine	   and	  Michigan	   for	   example,	  
provide	   carte	   blanche	   to	   State	   or	   federal	   agencies	   when	   using	   drones	   for	  
emergencies	   involving	   “conspiratorial	   activities	   threatening	   the	   national	  
security	   interest”	   or	   “conspiratorial	   activities	   characteristic	   of	   organized	  
crime.”37	   	   Idaho	   would	   permit	   drone	   use,	   without	   a	   warrant,	   to	   investigate	  
controlled	   substance	   crimes.38	   	   Additionally,	   California,	   Illinois,	   Oregon	   and	  
Texas	  would	  also	  allow	  drones	  to	  assess	  crime	  scenes	  sans	  warrant.39	  
	   A	  few	  state	  bills	  provide	  for	  land-­‐centric	  exceptions	  for	  drone	  use	  analogous	  
to	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine.40	   	  Nine	  permit	  drone	  use	  on	  or	  over	  public	   lands.41	  	  
The	  Alaska,	  New	  York,	  North	  Dakota	  and	  Texas	  bills	  would	  permit	  drone	  use	  to	  
monitor	  borders	  as	  well.42	  A	  handful	  of	  states	  allow	  for	  aerial	  inspections.43	  
	   While	  there	  are	  also	  states	  who	  would	  permit	  drone	  use	  for	  other	  
purposes,	  most	  bills	  merely	  reiterate,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  Fourth	  Amendment	  
protections	  that	  already	  exist	  –	  and	  do	  so	  only	  because	  the	  tool	  to	  be	  used	  is	  a	  
drone.44	  
                                                
37	  See	  H.B.	  1904,	  89th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ark.	  2013);	  S.B.	  783,	  27th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Haw.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  96th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mich.	  2012).	  
38	  “Absent	  a	  warrant,	  and	  except	  for	  .	  .	  .	  controlled	  substance	  investigations,	  no	  person,	  entity,	  
or	  State	  agency	  shall	  use	  an	  unmanned	  aircraft	  system	  to	  intentionally	  conduct	  surveillance	  .	  .	  .”	  
S.B.	  1134,	  §21-­‐213(2),	  62nd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Idaho	  2013).	  
39	  A.B.	  1327,	  §1,	  Title	  14,	  §14550(c)(2),	  	  2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013-­‐14);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §15(5),	  
98th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ill.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §6(1),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  
2013)	  and	  S.B.	  853,	  §7(1),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.002(8)(B)-­‐
(C),	  	  82nd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2011).	  
40	  See	  California	  v.	  Ciraolo,	  476	  U.S.	  207,	  213	  (1986);	  Florida	  v.	  Riley,	  488	  U.S.	  445,	  448	  (1989).	  
41	  Public	  land	  exception	  bills	  include:	  H.B.	  159,	  §2(b)(3)	  28th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Alaska	  2013);	  H.B.	  
2574,	  §1(D)(2),	  51st	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  A.B.	  1327,	  §1,	  Title	  14,	  §14550(c)(2),	  2013	  
Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013-­‐14);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §15(5),	  98th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Ill.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §9(1),	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mich.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196,	  §2(2)(B),	  63rd	  Leg.,	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mont.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §4.A.,	  54th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013)	  (allowing	  
drones	  to	  transit	  public	  land	  (over	  flight)	  including	  military	  aircraft	  carrying	  weapons);	  H.B.	  912,	  
§3(B)(6),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013).	  
42	  H.B.	  159,	  §2(b)(3),	  28th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Alaska	  2013)	  (allowing	  drone	  use	  on	  public	  land	  
and	  for	  border	  monitoring);	  S.B.	  4537,	  §1.3.A(3),	  2013	  Leg.,	  236th	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  
§3(1),	  63rd	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912	  Ch.	  423,	  §423.002(a)(14),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tx.	  2013)(allowing	  drone	  use	  on	  public	  land	  and	  for	  border	  monitoring).	  
43	  See	  A.B.	  1327,	  §14350(e)(1),	  2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1134,	  §1(4)	  and	  
§1.21-­‐213(1)(b)(ii),	  62nd	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Idaho	  2013);	  A.B.	  6541,	  §66-­‐A.3(D),	  2013	  Leg.,	  
236th	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §423.002(a),	  83rd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  S.	  
Paper	  126-­‐72,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  at	  §	  4503	  (Me.	  2013).	  See	  also	  footnotes	  infra	  47,	  49	  (discussing	  
drone	  use	  provisions	  allowing	  for	  assessment	  of	  damage	  to	  land	  as	  part	  of	  natural	  disasters	  
and	  for	  criminal	  or	  administrative	  investigations).	  
44	  A	  minority	  of	  bills	  allow	  drone	  use	  for	  non-­‐governmental	  or	  benign	  governmental	  use,	  such	  
as	  higher	  education,	  training,	  research,	  or	  recreation.	  See	  H.B.	  46,	  §305.639(2),	  98th	  Gen.	  
Assemb.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mont.	  2013);	  S.B.	  4537,	  §1.B,	  2013	  Leg.,	  236th	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013)	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C. Operational	  and	  Procedural	  Considerations	  
	   Disjointed	   state	   legislative	   drone	   proposals	   often	   contain	   procedural	  
hurdles	  and	  operational	  constraints	  that	  exceed	  the	  warrant	  requirements	   for	  
privacy.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   when	   operators	   may	   use	   drones,	   states	   have	   also	  
attempted	   to	   legislate	  how	   they	  may	  be	  used	   through	  a	   series	  of	  operational	  
restrictions	   and	   procedural	   requirements	   beyond	   obtaining	   a	   warrant	   and	  
collecting	   only	   on	   “the	   place	   to	   be	   searched	   or	   persons	   or	   things	   to	   be	  
seized.”45	   	   For	  example,	  before	  an	  agency	   can	  acquire	  a	  drone,	   several	   states	  
require	   explicit	   legislative	   approval	   to	   do	   so.46	   	   A	   discussion	   of	   other	   such	  
considerations	  follows.	  
	  
i. Weapons	  Restrictions	  
	  
	   Nearly	  one-­‐third	  of	  states	  restrict	  any	  drone	  operator	  from	  carrying	  or	  
employing	  weapons	  from	  drones.	  	  Of	  these,	  several	  preclude	  equipping	  drones	  
with	  non-­‐lethal	  weapons,	  pepper	  spray,	  bean	  bag	  guns,	  mace	  and	  sound-­‐based	  
weapons	  as	  well.47	  Imagine	  a	  scenario	  where	  a	  law	  enforcement	  agent	  could	  
use	  a	  drone	  to	  find	  a	  fleeing	  suspect,	  but	  could	  not	  use	  that	  same	  drone	  to	  stop	  
him	  if	  he	  started	  indiscriminately	  killing	  innocent	  civilians.	  	  These	  prohibitions	  
                                                                                                                             
(excluding	  recreational	  use	  of	  model	  airplanes);	  A.B.	  6541,	  §66-­‐A.3.(D),	  2013	  Leg.,	  236th	  Leg.	  
Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §3(4),	  63rd	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  
§1.7(a)-­‐(d),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.	  Paper	  126-­‐72,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  at	  §	  
4503.3	  (Me.	  2013);	  H.	  File	  2013-­‐990,	  §3(2),	  88th	  Leg.	  Sess.,	  at	  §	  3	  (Minn.	  2013).	  But	  see	  Section	  
A	  supra	  (permitting	  the	  U.S.	  Military	  to	  train	  with	  drones).	  	  	  
45
	  U.S.	  CONST.	  amend	  IV.	  
46	  Acquisition	  provisions	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  	  Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14351	  (Cal.	  2013)	  and	  
S.B.	  15,	  §	  14355	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  20,	  §	  6	  (Ind.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  
4502.1	  (Me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1	  amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  General	  Laws	  as	  99C(b)	  (Mass.	  2013)	  
and	  Mass.	  H.B.	  1357,	  §	  99C(b);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  3(2)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  B.	  A06451,	  §	  66-­‐A.1.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  2710,	  §	  1.(8)	  (Or.	  2013)	  and	  S.B.	  524,	  §	  1(8)	  (Or.	  2013);	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(b)	  
amending	  title	  12	  of	  Gen.	  Laws	  (R.I.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  4(1)	  (Wash.	  2013)	  and	  S.B.	  5782,	  §	  4(1)	  
–	  (2)	  (Wash.	  2013).	  
47	  The	  following	  drone	  bills	  contain	  weapons	  restrictions:	  H.B.	  1904	  §	  12-­‐19-­‐104	  (d)	  (Ark.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  No.	  15,	  §	  5,	  amending	  Title	  14,	  §	  14350	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  §	  14351(a)	  (Cal.	  2013)	  and	  A.B.	  
1327,	  §	  14354.5	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  200	  §	  3(1)	  (Ga.	  2013);	  S.B.	  783	  §	  1	  263B-­‐2(e)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  
276	  §	  14	  (Iowa	  2013)	  and	  H.F.	  410,	  §	  1.3	  (Iowa	  2013);	  H.B.	  2394	  §	  1(b)	  (Kan.	  2013);	  14	  Reg.	  
Sess.	  BR	  1,	  §	  1(2)	  (Ky.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72	  §	  4502.3	  (Me.	  2013);	  	  
S.B.	  1664	  §	  1(b)	  (Mass.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  1357,	  §	  99-­‐C(b)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455	  §	  3(4)	  (Mich.	  
2013);	  H.F.	  990,	  §	  3,	  Subd.	  3	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373	  §	  4(1)	  (N.D.	  2013);	  	  B.	  A06541	  §	  66-­‐A.5.	  
(N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  5.A	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  10	  (Or.	  2013)	  and	  S.B.	  524,	  §1(6)	  (Or.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  875,	  §	  5	  (Pa.	  2013);	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  B.	  395,	  Ch.	  39,	  §	  6-­‐39-­‐20	  (S.C.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540	  §	  
4622	  (e)	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2012	  §	  1(1)	  (Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐3	  (b)	  (W.	  Va.)	  and	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  
1-­‐7-­‐4(a)	  (W.Va.	  2013);	  and	  S.B.	  196/Assemb.	  B.	  203,	  §	  3	  (Wis.	  2013).	  
2013]	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are	  analogous	  to	  telling	  a	  police	  officer	  that	  he	  can	  search	  a	  house,	  but	  cannot	  
bring	  his	  gun.	  
	  
ii. Collection,	  Retention	  and	  Dissemination	  Requirements	  
	  
	   Many	   bills	   also	   restrict	   the	   time,	   place,	   and	   manner	   of	   drone	   operation.	  	  
One	  of	   the	  most	  common	  time	  restrictions	  on	  drone	  use	   is	  a	   forty-­‐eight	  hour	  
mission	   execution	  window.48	   States	  with	   place	   restrictions	   focus	   primarily	   on	  
the	   home	   and	   areas	   surrounding	   it,	   places	   of	   worship,	   as	   well	   as	   farms	   and	  
agricultural	   areas.49	   Most	   states	   that	   include	   manner	   restrictions	   in	   their	  
legislation	  generally	  require	  users	  to	  collect	  information	  only	  on	  the	  target	  and	  
to	  avoid	  or	  minimize	  data	  collection	  on	  others.50	   	  Some	  states	  contain	  unique	  
one-­‐off	  manner	   restrictions	   or	   constraints.	   	   For	   example,	   one	  New	   Jersey	   bill	  
would	   forbid	   drone	   use	   to	   enforce	   violations	   of	   motor	   vehicle	   or	   traffic	  
violations.51	   	   Massachusetts,	   North	   Dakota,	   and	   West	   Virginia	   for	   example,	  
preclude	   drone	   surveillance	   of	   citizens	   exercising	   their	   constitutional	   rights	  
relating	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  freedom	  of	  assembly.52	  
	   States	  often	   fail	   to	  consider	   the	   impact	  restrictions	  have	  on	  operational	  
effectiveness.	   	   In	   addition	   to	  manner	   restrictions	  on	  drone	  operations,	  many	  
states	   restrict	   how	   the	   information	   collected	   is	   used,	   disseminated,	   or	  
retained.	  	  A	  number	  of	  bills	  reviewed	  prohibit	  use	  of	  facial	  recognition	  or	  other	  
biometric	   matching	   technology,	   primarily	   on	   information	   collected	   on	   non-­‐
targets.53	   	   Very	   few	   bills	   address	   dissemination	   of	   information	   beyond	   the	  
                                                
48	  For	  time	  limitations	  on	  drone	  operations	  see	  A.B.	  1327	  §	  14350,	  (d)(2)	  (Cal.	  2013)	  (two	  
hours);	  H.B.	  560,	  §	  2(a)(4)	  (Ga.	  2013);	  S.B.	  783	  §	  1,	  263B-­‐2(c)(3)(B)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  
15(3)	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  4502.2.	  D	  (Me.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455	  §	  5(d)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  and	  H.B.	  1771	  §	  
6.(4)	  and	  S.B.	  5782,	  §	  8(1)(c)	  (Wash.	  2013).¶¶	  
49	  For	  place	  restrictions,	  see	  H.B.	  2574,	  amending	  §	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  B	  (Ariz.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  No.	  15,	  §	  3(j)	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  2563B-­‐2(c)(3)(A)-­‐(B)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1134,	  §	  1.21-­‐
213(2)(a)(i)-­‐(ii)	  (Idaho	  2013);	  S.B.	  556,	  §	  3.B.	  (N.M.	  2013);	  B.	  A06370/	  S04537,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.2.	  
(N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  6.4	  (N.D.	  2013).	  
50	  Manner	  restrictions	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  collecting	  only	  on	  the	  target	  include:	  H.B.	  1904,	  
amending	  Ark.	  Code	  Title	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐104(b)(1)	  (Ark.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  Title	  14,	  §	  14354(a)	  (Cal.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  263B-­‐2(d)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4502.3	  (Me.	  2013);	  	  
S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1,	  amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  General	  Laws	  as	  99C(d)(1)	  and	  (3)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455	  
§	  5(e)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232.(d)	  (N.C.	  2013);	  	  B.	  A06541,	  §	  66-­‐A.4.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
1556,	  §	  3.F	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  1.(4)	  (Or.	  2013)	  and	  S.B.	  524,	  §	  1(4)	  (Or.	  2013);	  	  Gen.	  
Assemb.,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(h)	  amending	  title	  12	  of	  General	  Laws	  (R.I.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540/S.B.	  16,	  
amending	  §	  1	  20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  as,	  §	  4622(c)(1)	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  4	  (Wash.	  2013).	  
51	  Assemb.	  No.	  3157,	  §	  2.e	  (N.J.	  2012).	  
52	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1,	  amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  Gen.	  Laws	  as	  99C(d)(3)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  4.3	  
(N.D.	  2013)	  and	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐4(c)	  (W.Va.	  2013).	  
53	  See	  H.B.	  1904,	  §	  1(b)(2),	  89th	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ark.	  2013);	  S.B.	  2563B-­‐2(d)	  (Haw.);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  62	  
collecting	  agency.54	  	  That	  said,	  some	  states	  require	  dissemination,	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   notice,	   to	   the	   subject	   of	   drone	   monitoring.55	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  
majority	   of	   bills	   address	   retention.	   	   The	   primary	   theme	   on	   retention	   is	   to	  
delete	   information	   collected	  unlawfully	   or	   on	   non-­‐targets	  within	   twenty-­‐four	  
hours	   of	   collection.56	   	   Other	   states	   have	   retention	   limits	   on	   information	  
lawfully	   collected	   on	   a	   target	   of	   surveillance,	   unless	   needed	   for	   a	   criminal	  
investigation	  or	  prosecution.57	  Only	  California	   seems	   to	  understand	   the	  need	  
for	   operators,	   whether	  military	   or	   civilian,	   to	   train	   to	   their	   required	   task	   by	  
allowing	   images	   to	   be	   kept	   beyond	   their	   normal	   time	   limit	   for	   “training	  
purposes.”58	  	  To	  the	  extent	  the	  desired	  endstates	  for	  drone	  operations	  consist	  
of	   both	   privacy	   protection	   and	   operational	   effectiveness,	   training	   for	   such	  
operations	  is	  a	  critical	  necessity.	  
                                                                                                                             
S.P.	  72,	  §	  4502.3.C.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1(d)(2)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455	  §	  
5(e)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐A.4,	  2013-­‐2014	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013-­‐2014);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  
15A-­‐232.(d),	  2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.C.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853	  §	  4.1,	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (Or.	  2013);	  Title	  
12	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(h),	  amended	  by	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013;	  H.B.	  540,	  §	  
4622(c)(3)	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  6(3),	  63rd	  Leg.	  Sess.	  (Wash.	  2013).	  
54	  See,	  e.g.,	  S.B.	  No.	  15,	  §	  5,	  amending	  Title	  14,	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code	  14350(b)	  (Cal.	  2013)	  (stating	  
that	  a	  law	  enforcement	  agency	  cannot	  receive	  drone	  information	  from	  another	  agency	  unless	  
they	  have	  a	  warrant);	  A.B.	  1327,	  §	  14350(e)(3)	  (Cal.	  2013)	  	  (“Data	  collected	  pursuant	  to	  this	  
subdivision	  shall	  not	  be	  disseminated	  outside	  the	  collecting	  agency	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  25	  (Ill.	  
2013)	  (forbidding	  disclosure	  to	  another	  government	  agency	  unless	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  criminal	  
activity	  or	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  an	  ongoing	  investigation	  or	  trial);	  H.B.	  1357,	  §	  99C(e)	  (Mass.	  
2013)	  (disallowing	  disclosure	  of	  non-­‐target	  information	  for	  any	  purpose	  without	  written	  
consent);	  H.B.	  2997,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6(c)	  (W.	  Va.	  2013)	  (permitting	  distribution	  only	  where	  data	  
collected	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  crime	  and	  complies	  with	  evidentiary	  rules).	  
55	  See	  S.B.	  2563B-­‐5	  (Haw.)	  ;	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  4505(1),	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  99C(h)	  
(Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  11(1)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  9.(1),	  (3),	  77th	  Leg.	  Assemb.	  (Or.	  
2013);	  Title	  12	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(h),	  amended	  by	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013;	  
H.B.	  1771,	  §	  6(5)	  and	  S.B.	  5782,	  §	  6(5),	  63rd	  Leg.	  (Wash.	  2013)	  	  
56	  See	  H.B.1904,	  §	  1.12-­‐19-­‐105(a)(1)	  (Ark.	  2013);	  S.B.	  263B-­‐3(a)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  4503	  
(Me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  99C(e)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  7(1)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐B	  
(N.Y.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  No.	  3157,	  215th	  Leg.	  §	  2.d,	  (N.J.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232(g)	  (N.C.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  63d	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  §	  6.3	  (N.D.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  1556,	  54th	  Leg,	  1st	  Sess.	  
§	  3.F	  (Okla.	  2013);	  	  Title	  12	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(h),	  amended	  by	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  
Jan.	  2013;	  S.B.	  796,	  108th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  §1(f)	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540(c)(2)(B)	  (Vt.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  11	  (Wash.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6(b)	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).	  
57	  See,	  e.g.,	  A.B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14353	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  No.	  15,	  §	  5	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  
20(1)-­‐(2)	  (Ill.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  63rd	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  §	  6.2	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  77th	  Or.	  Leg.	  
Assemb.	  Reg.	  Sess.	  §	  3.(1)(a)	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  524,	  77th	  Or.	  Leg.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  	  §	  1(5)	  (Or.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  796,	  108th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  §1(f	  )	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  12	  (Wash.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6(c)	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).¶	  
58	  See	  A.B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14353(a)	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  No.	  15,	  §	  5,	  Title	  14,	  14354(b)	  (Cal.	  
2013).	  
2013]	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iii. Oversight	  and	  Reporting	  Regimes	  
	   Oversight	   of	   information	   collected	   and	   transparency	   of	   operations	   are	  
reasonable	   safeguards	   to	   protect	   civil	   liberties.	   	   However,	   a	  majority	   of	   bills	  
contain	   documentation,	   oversight,	   and	   reporting	   requirements	   that	   test	   the	  
limits	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  For	  example,	  even	  in	  emergent	  circumstances,	  many	  
states	   require	   responders	   to	   file	   a	   sworn	   statement	   or	   warrant	   application,	  
stating	   the	   grounds	   for	   the	   emergency	   drone	   use	   within	   24	   to	   48	   hours.59	  	  
Most	  have	  reporting	  rules	  that	  require	  law	  enforcement,	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  
the	   judiciary	   and	   court	   administrators,	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   these	   to	   file	  
extensive	   reports	   on	   drone	   activities	   annually.60	   	   Other	   proposals	   are	   more	  
moderate,	   such	   as	   those	   from	  Maine,	   North	   Dakota,	   Washington	   and	  West	  
Virginia	   for	   example,	   which	   explicitly	   require	   record	   keeping	   on	   drone	  
operations.61	   	   Oversight	   is	   also	   exercised	   through	   public	   transparency.	   	   A	  
handful	   of	   states	   require	   public	   notice	   of	   drone	   operations,	   images,	   and	  
government	   agency	   drone	   reports	   filed.62	   	   Care	  must	   be	   taken	   in	   any	   public	  
disclosure	   to	   ensure	   that	   investigations	   or	   operations	   are	   not	   compromised	  





                                                
59	  States	  with	  post-­‐emergency	  documentation	  requirements	  include:	  	  H.B.	  1904,	  §	  1,	  Ch.	  19,	  
12-­‐19-­‐104.(a)(2)(B)(i)	  (Ark.	  2013);	  S.B.	  263B-­‐4(a)(4)	  (Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §15(3)	  (Ill.	  2013);	  
S.P.	  72,	  §	  4503.1.B.	  (Me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1(c)(3)(ii)	  (Mass.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  5(b)(i)-­‐(ii)	  
(Mich.	  2013);	  	  H.F.	  990,	  103	  Leg.,	  88th	  Sess.	  §	  3,	  Subd.	  5	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐
232.(c)(3)b.	  (N.C.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  3.B.3.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  6(2)	  (Or.	  2013);	  Title	  12	  R.I.	  
Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐2.(h),	  amended	  by	  R.I.	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013;	  H.B.	  540,	  §	  
4623(a)(2)	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  6(2)	  (Wash.	  2013).	  
60	  See	  e.g.,	  H.B.1904,	  §12-­‐19-­‐106(a)	  (Ark.	  2013);	  A.B.	  1327,	  §	  14351(b)	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  263B-­‐7	  
(Haw.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  35	  (Ill.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  4507	  (me.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1664,	  §	  1	  (Mass.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  4455,	  §	  15(1)-­‐(3)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐D	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232.(h)	  (N.C.	  
2013);	  S.B.	  71	  §	  4(1)	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  10	  (Or.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  8	  (Or.	  2013);	  RI	  Gen.	  
Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013,	  amending	  title	  12	  of	  General	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐12;	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.008	  
(Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  540	  (Vt.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  15-­‐18,	  21	  (Wash.	  2013);	  S.B.	  5782,	  §	  15-­‐18,	  22	  
(Wash.	  2013).	  
61	  See	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4506.4;	  	  ND	  HB	  1373,	  §	  7;	  WA	  HB	  1771,	  §	  20	  
and	  WV	  HB	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐7.	  
62	  CA	  Assembly	  Bill	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14352	  and	  §	  14352	  and	  CA	  SB	  No.	  15,	  amending	  Penal	  
Code	  14354(c);	  	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  35;	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4507.3;	  NJ	  Assembly	  
No.	  3157,	  §	  3.a.;	  	  NY	  AO	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐D;	  NC	  HB	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232.(h);	  OR	  SB	  853,	  §	  10	  and	  OR	  2710,	  
§	  	  8	  and	  WA	  HB	  1771,	  §	  19,	  21	  and	  WA	  SB	  5782,	  §	  15-­‐18.	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iv. Unique	  Conditions	  
	   Besides	   the	   more	   common	   language	   discussed	   above,	   some	   states	   have	  
unique	  drone	  requirements.	  	  California	  and	  Michigan	  require	  marking	  the	  body	  
of	   a	   drone	   in	   some	   distinctive	   manner.63	   Oklahoma	   contains	   a	   non-­‐liability	  
clause	   that	   protects	   drone	   manufacturers	   and	   sellers.64	   Oregon	   and	   Virginia	  
direct	   drone	   operating	   agencies	   to	   adopt	   policies	   for	   their	   use	   that	   establish	  
training	   requirements	   for	   operators;	   criteria	   for	  when	   drones	  will	   be	   used;	   a	  
description	   of	   the	   areas	   in	   which	   drones	   will	   be	   used;	   and	   a	   procedure	   for	  
informing	  the	  public	  of	  those	  policies.65	  
	   This	   disjointed	   state	   approach,	   regulating	   everything	   from	   whether	   an	  
aircraft	   can	   be	   equipped	   with	   weapons,	   to	   forbidding	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	  
information	   it	   collects	   to	   other	   agencies,	   to	   unique	   oversight	   and	   reporting	  
regimes,	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  standard	  warrant	  requirement.	  
D. Violation	  Ramifications	  
	   State	   drone	   proposals	   contain	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   ramifications	   for	   violating	  
their	   provisions,	   including	  exclusionary	   rules,	   personal	   liability	   provisions,	   and	  
forward-­‐leaning	  preventive	  measures	  which	  could	  have	  direct	  as	  well	  as	  second	  
and	   third	  order	   impacts	  on	  drone	  operators.	   	  Given	   that	   the	   focus	  of	  most	  of	  
the	  state	  drone	  legislative	  proposals	  is	  on	  law	  enforcement	  activities,	  the	  most	  
common	   ramification	   for	   violating	   state	   drone	   provisions	   is	   excluding	  
information	   or	   evidence	   collected	   in	   violation	   of	   state	   procedures	   from	  
admission	   in	   court.	   	   More	   than	   half	   of	   the	   state	   bills	   contain	   a	   criminal	  
exclusionary	   rule.66	   	   Slightly	   more	   than	   a	   third	   contain	   provisions	   excluding	  
                                                
63	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  5	  amending	  14356	  of	  Penal	  Code	  (Cal.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  3(5)	  (Mich.	  2013).	  
64	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  6	  (Okla.	  2013).	  	  	  
65	  H.B.	  2710	  (Or.	  2013),	  §	  1.(7)(a)-­‐(d)	  and	  SB	  853,	  §	  11	  (1);	  VA	  HB	  2012,	  1.	  §	  1.1.	  
66	  States	  with	  criminal	  exclusionary	  rules	  include	  AL	  SB	  317,	  §	  1(d);	  AK	  HB	  159a,	  §	  3(a);	  AZ	  	  HB	  
2574,	  amending	  §	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  C;	  	  AR	  	  HB1904,	  amending	  AR	  Code	  Title	  
12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐105(b);	  	  FL	  SB	  92,	  §	  1(5);	  	  HI	  SB,	  2563B-­‐3(b);	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  30;	  	  IN	  SB	  20,	  Sec	  (5);	  IA	  
HF	  427,	  §1.5;	  	  KS	  HB	  2394	  §	  1(e);	  KY	  HB	  454,	  §	  5	  and	  KY	  14	  RS	  BR	  1,	  §	  1(5);	  	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  
1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4503;	  	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4506.3.;	  	  MD	  HB	  1233,	  1-­‐
203-­‐1(D);	  	  MA	  SB	  1664,	  §	  1,	  amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  General	  Laws	  as	  99C(f)	  and	  MA	  HB	  1357,	  §	  
99-­‐C(f);	  	  MI	  HB	  4455	  §	  7(2);	  	  MN	  HF	  SF	  1506,	  §	  1,	  Sub	  5,	  MN	  1620/1706,	  §	  3,	  Sub.	  5	  and	  MN	  HF	  
990,	  §	  1,	  Subd.	  7;	  	  MO	  HB	  46,	  §	  305.641.2;	  	  MT	  SB	  196,	  §	  1(1)(b);	  	  NE	  LB	  412,	  §	  6;	  	  NJ	  Assembly	  
No.	  3157,	  §2.d.	  and	  NJ	  AB	  3929,	  ¶	  3;	  NM	  SB	  556,	  §	  5.B.;	  	  NY	  	  AO	  6370/SO	  4537,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.4.B.,	  
NY	  AO	  6244,	  §	  1.	  S	  700.16,	  ¶	  3	  and	  NY	  AO	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐B.2.;	  	  NC	  HB	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232.(f);	  	  ND	  HB	  
1373,	  §	  6.1;	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(B);	  	  OK	  HB	  1556,	  §	  3.E.	  and	  §	  4.E.;	  	  OR	  HF	  2710,	  §	  11,	  OR	  SB	  
71,	  §	  4(3)	  and	  OR	  SB	  853,	  §	  4(2)(a)	  and	  8(2)(a);	  	  RI	  Gen.	  Assembly	  Jan.	  2013,	  amending	  title	  12	  
of	  General	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐8,	  .9	  and	  11.;	  RI	  LC00564,	  §	  12-­‐5.3.2;	  	  SC	  H	  3415,	  §	  2(D);	  TN	  HB	  
591,	  §	  1(f)	  and	  TN	  SB	  796,	  §	  1(g)(2);	  TX	  HB	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.005(1);	  	  VT	  HB	  540/SB	  16,	  
2013]	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information	  gathered	  by	  drones	  from	  civil	  or	  administrative	  hearings.67	  	  Several	  
bills	   contain	  a	   “fruit	  of	   the	  poisonous”	   tree	  exclusionary	   rule,	  which	  prohibits	  
use	   of	   information	   and	   evidence	   derived	   from	   information	   gathered	   by	  
drones.68	   	  Montana	  and	  Oregon	  expressly	  ban	  the	  government	  from	  including	  
information	  acquired	  by	  drones	  in	  an	  affidavit	  to	  obtain	  a	  warrant.69	  
	   More	   than	  half	   of	   the	   state	  bills	   create	   civil	   liability	   for	   violators.70	   	  Many	  
                                                                                                                             
amending	  §	  1	  20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  as,	  §	  4622(d);	  	  WA	  HB	  1771/WA	  SB	  5782	  §	  10;	  	  WI	  SB	  196/AB	  
203,	  §	  5,	  amending	  §	  972.113;	  	  WV	  HB	  2732,	  Art.	  7,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6.,	  WV	  HB	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6(a);	  WY	  HB	  
0242,	  7-­‐3-­‐1005.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  State	  fails	  to	  include	  a	  specific	  criminal	  exclusionary	  provision	  in	  
their	  bill,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  courts	  would	  still	  exclude	  the	  evidence	  consistent	  with	  
their	  constitution	  or	  other	  law	  if	  law	  enforcement	  did	  not	  obtain	  a	  warrant,	  unless	  a	  judicial	  
exception	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  applied.	  
67	  For	  civil	  or	  administrative	  exclusionary	  rules	  see:	  	  AK	  HB	  159a,	  §	  1(a);	  	  AZ	  	  HB	  2574,	  amending	  
§	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  C;	  	  AR	  	  HB1904,	  amending	  AR	  Code	  Title	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐
105(b);	  	  GA	  HB	  560,	  §	  2(e);	  	  HI	  SB,	  2563B-­‐3(b);	  	  IL	  SB	  1587,	  §	  30;	  IN	  SB	  20,	  Sec	  (5);	  	  KY	  HB	  454,	  §	  
5;	  	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4503	  and	  KY	  14	  RS	  BR	  1,	  §	  1(5);	  	  ME	  SP	  72,	  amends	  
§	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4506.3.;	  MA	  SB	  1664,	  §	  1,	  amending	  Ch.	  272	  of	  General	  Laws	  as	  99C(f)	  
and	  MA	  HB	  1357,	  §	  99-­‐C(f);	  	  MI	  HB	  4455	  §	  7(2);	  MN	  HF	  990,	  §	  1,	  Subd.	  7;	  	  	  MO	  HB	  46,	  §	  
305.641.2;	  	  MT	  SB	  196,	  §	  1(1)(b);	  	  MT	  SB	  196,	  §	  2(3);	  	  NM	  SB	  556,	  §	  5.B.;	  	  NY	  	  AO	  6370/SO	  4537,	  
§	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.4.B.	  and	  NY	  AO	  6541,	  §	  66-­‐B.2.;	  	  NC	  HB	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232.(f);	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(B);	  
OK	  HB	  1556,	  §	  3.E.	  &	  4.E.;	  	  OR	  HF	  2710,	  §	  11,	  OR	  SB	  71,	  §	  4(3)	  and	  OR	  SB	  853,	  §	  4(2)(a)	  and	  
8(2)(a);	  RI	  LC000564,	  §	  12-­‐5.3-­‐2;	  TX	  HB	  912,	  Ch.	  423,	  §	  423.005(1);	  	  VT	  HB	  540/SB	  16,	  amending	  
§	  1	  20	  V.S.A.	  Ch.	  205	  as,	  §4622(d);	  	  WA	  HB	  1771/WA	  SB	  5782	  §	  10	  and	  WV	  HB	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐6(a).	  
68	  Derivative	  evidence	  exclusions	  include	  AR	  	  HB1904,	  amending	  AR	  Code	  Title	  12,	  as	  12-­‐19-­‐
105(b);	  	  GA	  HB	  560,	  §	  2(e);	  IN	  SB	  20,	  Sec	  (5);	  	  KS	  HB	  2394	  §	  1(e);	  	  MA	  SB	  1664,	  §	  1,	  amending	  
Ch.	  272	  of	  General	  Laws	  as	  99C(f);	  	  MI	  HB	  4455	  §	  7(2);	  	  NJ	  Assembly	  No.	  3157,	  §2.d.;	  	  NY	  	  AO	  
6370/SO	  4537,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.4.B.;	  OH	  HB	  207,	  §	  4561.50(B);	  	  OK	  HB	  1556,	  §	  3.E.	  &	  4.E.;	  OR	  HF	  
2710,	  §	  11,	  OR	  SB	  853,	  §	  4(2)(a);	  RI	  LC000564,	  §	  12-­‐5.3-­‐2;	  	  WA	  HB	  1771/WA	  SB	  5782	  ,	  §	  10.	  
69	  S.B.	  196,	  §	  2(3),	  63rd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mont.	  2013).;	  H.B.	  2710	  ,	  §	  11(2),	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  853,	  §	  2(1)(b),	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013).	  
70	  The	  following	  bills	  create	  civil	  liability	  for	  drone	  users	  who	  violate	  State	  provisions:	  	  H.B.	  
2574,	  amending	  §	  1,	  Title	  13,	  Ch.	  30	  ARS,	  13-­‐3007,	  §	  E,	  51st	  Leg.	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  
Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  Title	  14,	  14352,	  2013-­‐14	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  92	  §	  1(5),	  Reg.	  
Sess.	  (Fla.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  2	  amending	  §	  1708.8,	  2013-­‐14	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  1134,	  
§	  1.21-­‐213(3)(a),	  62d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Idaho	  2013);	  H.F.	  427,	  §	  1.4,	  85th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Iowa	  
2013);	  H.B.	  2394,	  §	  1(d),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Kan.	  2013);	  H.B.	  454,	  §	  4,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  1,	  
25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4505,	  126th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1233,	  §	  1-­‐203-­‐1(C),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Md.	  2013);	  H.F.	  1506,	  §	  1(4),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  S.F.	  1620,	  §	  3(5),	  88th	  Leg.,	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.F.	  990,	  §	  1(6)(b),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  
305.641.1-­‐.3,	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mo.	  2013);	  L.B.	  412,	  §	  5,	  103d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Neb.	  2013);	  
S.B.	  556,	  §	  5(A),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.M.	  2013);	  A.O.	  3929,	  §	  2,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.J.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6370,	  §	  1,	  S	  
52-­‐A(4)(C),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  A.O.	  6244,	  §	  1	  S	  700.16(3),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  
15A-­‐232.(e),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  4,	  63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  207,	  §	  
4561.50(C),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ohio	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  3(D),	  54th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
2710,	  §	  14-­‐15,	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  RI	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  Jan.	  2013,	  amending	  title	  12	  of	  
Gen.	  Laws,	  Ch.	  5.3,	  12-­‐5.3.-­‐10.;	  	  H.B.	  3415,	  §	  2(c),	  120th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (S.C.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  591,	  §	  
1(e),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tenn.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.006(2-­‐3),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  13,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  66	  
include	   civil	   equitable	   relief,	   including	   injunctions	   to	   preclude	   drone	   use	   in	  
advance	  of	  employment	  or	  to	  prevent	  the	  use	  of	  information	  collected.71	  	  Many	  
bills	   contain	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   potential	   civil	   penalties	   ranging	   from	   actual	  
damages,	   to	   punitive	   and	   treble	   damages.72	   	   Almost	   thirty	   percent	   of	   states	  
make	   it	   a	   crime,	   ranging	   from	   misdemeanor	   to	   a	   felony,	   to	   use	   drones	   in	  
violation	   of	   their	   provisions.73	   	   A	   few	   bills	   even	   provide	   for	   administrative	  
discipline	  for	  such	  violations.74	  
	   Exclusionary	  rules,	  and	  concomitant	  disciplinary	  measures,	  are	  time-­‐
honored	  remedies	  in	  a	  Fourth	  Amendment	  setting,	  yet	  bills	  that	  lack	  the	  full	  
panoply	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  exceptions	  are	  fatally	  flawed.	  
III. DEPARTMENT	  OF	  DEFENSE	  POLICIES	  
	   DoD	   policies	   take	   a	   nuanced	   approach	   that	  maximizes	   drone	   use	  without	  
sacrificing	  civil	  liberties.	  	  The	  disjointed	  state	  approach	  to	  drone	  operations	  is	  a	  
striking	   contrast	   to	   DoD	   policies.	   	   Even	   before	   the	   DoD	   operated	   drones,	   a	  
                                                                                                                             
63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wash.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐5,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐
5,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013).¶	  
71	  Injunctive	  relief	  provisions	  include:	  S.B.	  317,	  §	  1(c),	  2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ala.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
2574,	  §	  1,	  13-­‐3007(e),	  51st	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  1327,	  §	  1,	  14352,	  2013-­‐14	  
Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  2(h),	  2013-­‐14	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  	  S.B.	  92,	  §	  1(5),	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (Fla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2394,	  §	  1(d),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Kan.	  2013);	  H.B.	  454,	  §	  4,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ky.	  
2013);	  S.P.	  72,	  §	  4506,	  126th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1233,	  §	  1-­‐203-­‐1(c),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Md.	  2013);	  MN	  1620/	  1706,	  §	  3,	  Sub.	  5;	  	  H.B.	  46,	  §	  305.641.1,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ohio	  2013);	  S.B.	  556,	  
§	  5(A),	  51st	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.M.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  O.	  3929,	  §	  2,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.J.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  
O.	  6370,	  §	  1	  S	  52-­‐A.4C,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  O.	  6370,	  §	  1	  S	  700.16(3),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  1373,	  §	  4,	  63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.D.	  2013);	  H.B.	  3415,	  §	  2(c),	  120th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(S.C.	  2013);	  	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.006(1),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1771,	  §	  13,	  63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(Wash.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2732,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐5,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (W.	  Va.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2997,	  §	  1-­‐7-­‐5,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (W.	  
Va.	  2013).	  
72	  For	  specific	  information	  on	  civil	  damages,	  see	  provisions	  outlined	  in	  footnote	  82.	  	  
73	  See	  H.B.	  159,	  §	  2(d),	  28th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Alaska	  2013);	  H.B.	  2574,	  §	  1,	  title	  13,	  Ch.	  30,	  13-­‐
3007(f),	  51st	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ariz.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  3(j),	  2013-­‐14	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013);	  
H.B.	  560,	  §	  2(b-­‐d),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ga.	  2013);	  S.B.	  20,	  §	  4(b),	  118th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ind.	  2013);	  H.B.	  
4455,	  §	  17,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mich.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1620,	  §	  3(2),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  H.F.	  
990,	  §	  1(6)(a),	  88th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Minn.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196,	  §	  1(1)(c),	  63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mont.	  
2013);	  H.B.	  619,	  §	  IV(a);	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.H.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  B.	  3157,	  §	  5,	  215th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  
(N.J.	  2013);	  S.B.	  556,	  §	  5(c),	  51st	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.M.	  2013);	  Assemb.	  O.	  6370,	  §	  1,	  S	  52-­‐A.4.A,	  
Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.Y.	  2013);	  H.B.	  312,	  §	  15A-­‐232(e),	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (N.C.	  2013);	  H.B.	  1556,	  §	  4(d),	  5(b),	  
54th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013);	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  13(1),	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  S.B.	  71,	  §	  
2-­‐3,	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013);	  H.B.	  912,	  §	  423.004,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Tex.	  2013);	  S.B.	  5782,	  §	  13,	  
63d	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wash.	  2013);	  S.B.	  196,	  §	  3,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Wis.	  2013).	  
74	  Administrative	  disciplinary	  provisions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  S.B.	  263B-­‐3(c),	  263B-­‐6,	  27th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  
Sess.	  (Haw.	  2013);	  H.B.	  4455,	  §	  13(1),	  ,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mich.	  2013).	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series	   of	   Intelligence	   Oversight	   (IO)	   policies	   were	   created	   to	   govern	   the	  
intelligence	  capabilities	  when	  collecting	  images	  and	  information.75	  	  The	  DoD	  has	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  national	  security	  responsibilities	  that	  may	  require	  collection	  of	  
imagery	  domestically	  using	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  airborne	  vehicles,	  including	  
drones.76	  	  However,	  in	  general,	  the	  DoD	  cannot	  do	  so	  unless	  some	  very	  specific	  
conditions	   are	   met.	   These	   conditions	   are	   codified	   in	   a	   host	   of	   IO	   and	   other	  
policies	  and	  rules.77	  
	   Executive	  Order	  (EO)	  12333,	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  Activities,	  applies	  to	  
all	   intelligence	  platforms	  that	  domestically	  collect	   information	  on	  U.S.	  persons	  
(USPER)	  using	  airborne	  assets.78	   	   EO	  12333	  guides	   the	  conduct	  of	   intelligence	  
activities79	   within	   a	   strict	   framework	   that	   balances	   the	   need	   for	   effective	  
intelligence	   with	   the	   “protection	   of	   constitutional	   rights”	   through	   collection,	  
retention,	   dissemination,	   and	   oversight	   processes.80	   	   Under	   this	   framework	  
drones	   can	   only	   collect	   information	   on	   USPER	   in	   limited	   circumstances.81	   	   In	  
                                                
75	  See	  Executive	  Order	  (EO)	  12333,	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  Activities	  (As	  amended	  by	  
Executive	  Orders	  13284	  (2003),	  13355	  (2004)	  and	  13470	  (2008),	  
http://www.archives.gov/federal-­‐register/codification/executive-­‐order/12333.html.	  DoDD	  
5200.27,	  Acquisition	  of	  Information	  Concerning	  Persons	  and	  Organizations	  not	  Affiliated	  with	  
the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  applies	  to	  non-­‐intelligence	  capability	  (IC)	  collection	  of	  information	  
on	  persons	  and	  organizations	  not	  affiliated	  with	  the	  DoD.	  	  The	  National	  Guard	  has	  adopted	  a	  
similar	  IO	  rules.	  	  Chief	  National	  Guard	  Bureau	  Manual	  2000.01,National	  Guard	  Intelligence	  
Activities,	  26	  November	  2012,	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/CNGBI/CNGBM2000_01_20121126.pdf.	  
76	  For	  example,	  the	  DoD	  needs	  to	  train	  using	  drones	  for	  combat	  proficiency,	  to	  give	  support	  to	  
civil	  authorities	  during	  crisis	  situations	  or	  to	  protect	  the	  people,	  facilities	  and	  equipment	  under	  
their	  charge.	  Whereas	  support	  to	  civil	  authorities	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  mission	  of	  the	  Services,	  
organizing,	  training	  and	  equipping	  combat	  ready	  forces	  to	  be	  prepared	  to	  fight	  our	  nation’s	  
wars	  is	  a	  statutory	  duty.	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  8013	  (2006).	  
77	  Drones	  are	  an	  Intelligence,	  Surveillance	  and	  Reconnaissance	  (ISR)	  platform	  and,	  as	  such,	  are	  
considered	  an	  intelligence	  capability	  to	  which	  IO	  rules	  apply.	  	  This	  article	  focuses	  only	  on	  IO	  
policies.	  However,	  other	  mission-­‐specific	  and	  drone-­‐centric	  policies	  are	  described	  in	  greater	  detail	  
in	  Col.	  Dawn	  M.	  K.	  Zoldi,	  USAF,	  Protecting	  Security	  and	  Privacy:	  	  An	  Analytical	  Framework	  for	  
Airborne	  Domestic	  Imagery,	  forthcoming,	  70	  AIR	  FORCE	  LAW	  REV.	  (forthcoming	  Spring	  2013),	  
available	  at	  	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379141.	  
78	  See	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  Activities,	  73	  Fed.	  Reg.	  45,	  325	  (Aug.	  2008),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-­‐2008-­‐08-­‐04/pdf/E8-­‐17940.pdf.	  	  
79
	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  DIR.	  5240.01-­‐R,	  PROCEDURES	  GOVERNING	  THE	  ACTIVITIES	  OF	  DOD	  INTELLIGENCE	  
COMPONENTS	  THAT	  AFFECT	  U.S.	  PERSONS	  (Dec.	  1982),	  available	  at	  
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524001r.pdf	  (describing	  how	  the	  EO	  	  defines	  
intelligence	  activities	  as	  countering	  foreign	  threats	  but	  DoD	  and	  Service	  directives	  broaden	  this	  
definition	  to	  “intelligence	  related	  activities.”).	  
80	  See	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  Activities,	  73	  Fed.	  Reg.	  45,325,	  2	  (Aug.	  2008),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-­‐2008-­‐08-­‐04/pdf/E8-­‐17940.pdf.	  
81
	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  DIR.	  5240.01-­‐R,	  ¶	  C2.3,	  at	  16;	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  AIR	  FORCE,	  INSTR.	  14-­‐104,	  ¶	  A2.3	  	  
(explaining	  how	  under	  the	  EO	  12333,	  USPER	  “means	  a	  United	  States	  citizen,	  an	  alien	  known	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  68	  
contrast	   to	   many	   state	   legislative	   proposals,	   DoD	   policy	   clearly	   states	   that	  
collection	   of	  USPER	   information	   by	   intelligence	   assets	   “shall	   be	   accomplished	  
by	  the	  least	   intrusive	  means.”82	   	  DoD	  policy	  also	  contains	  specific	  guidance	  on	  
retaining	   USPER	   identifying	   data.	   	   If	   properly	   collected,	   USPER	   data	   may	   be	  
retained.	   	   Otherwise,	   with	   limited	   exception,	   USPER	   information	   “acquired	  
incidentally”	  will	   be	   retained	  only	   temporarily,	   for	   no	  more	   than	  ninety	  days,	  
unless	  it	  indicates	  involvement	  in	  activities	  that	  may	  violate	  Federal,	  State,	  local	  
or	  foreign	  law.83	  	  Once	  properly	  collected	  and	  retained,	  USPER	  information	  may	  
only	  be	  disseminated	  to	  limited	  government	  recipients	  for	  the	  “performance	  of	  
a	  lawful	  governmental	  function.”84	  	  Any	  other	  dissemination	  requires	  approval	  
of	   the	  DoD	  component’s	   legal	  office,	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice,	  and	   the	  DoD	  
General	  Counsel.85	  
	   Under	   IO	  rules,	   the	  approval	  authority	   to	  collect	  USPER	   information	  varies	  
depending	  on	  which	   special	   collection	  procedure	   is	  used.86	   	  Most	  activities	  or	  
                                                                                                                             
the	  intelligence	  element	  concerned	  to	  be	  a	  permanent	  resident	  alien,	  an	  unincorporated	  
association	  substantially	  composed	  of	  United	  States	  citizens	  or	  permanent	  resident	  aliens,	  or	  a	  
corporation	  incorporated	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  except	  for	  a	  corporation	  directed	  and	  controlled	  
by	  a	  foreign	  government	  or	  governments.”	  	  DoD	  can	  only	  collect	  on	  USPER	  if	  information	  is	  
obtained	  with	  the	  individual’s	  consent;	  is	  publically	  available;	  constitutes	  foreign	  intelligence	  or	  
counter	  intelligence	  (FI/CI);	  concerns	  potential	  intelligence	  sources	  or	  agents;	  is	  needed	  to	  
protect	  intelligence	  sources	  or	  methods;	  is	  related	  to	  threats	  to	  or	  to	  protect	  the	  physical	  
security	  of	  IC-­‐affiliated	  persons,	  installations;	  is	  needed	  to	  protect	  intelligence	  and	  CI	  methods,	  
sources,	  activities	  from	  disclosure;	  is	  required	  for	  personnel	  security	  or	  communications	  
security	  investigations;	  is	  obtained	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  lawful	  FI/CI	  or	  international	  narcotics	  
or	  terrorism	  investigation;	  is	  necessary	  for	  administrative	  purposes;	  is	  acquired	  by	  overhead	  
reconnaissance	  not	  directed	  at	  USPER	  and	  is	  incidentally	  obtained	  that	  may	  indicate	  involving	  
in	  activities	  that	  may	  violate	  Federal,	  State,	  local	  or	  foreign	  laws.	  	  	  
82U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  DIR.	  5240.01-­‐R,	  ¶	  C2.4.1.-­‐	  C2.4.2	  (discussing	  how	  collection	  rules	  are	  
contained	  in	  “Procedure	  2”	  of	  DoD	  5240.1-­‐R.	  This	  means,	  generally,	  to	  the	  “extent	  feasible”	  
that	  information	  should	  be	  collected	  from	  publically	  available	  sources	  or	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  
the	  person	  concerned.	  Should	  publically	  available	  information	  or	  consent	  not	  be	  feasible	  or	  
sufficient,	  other	  means	  of	  obtaining	  the	  information	  include:	  collection	  from	  cooperating	  
sources,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  other	  lawful	  investigative	  techniques	  that	  do	  not	  require	  a	  warrant	  
or	  approval	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General	  or	  by	  obtaining	  a	  judicial	  warrant).	  
83	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  C3.3.4.	  and	  C3.3.2.4	  (discussing	  how	  the	  90	  day	  period	  is	  “solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
determining	  whether	  that	  information	  may	  be	  permanently	  retained	  under”	  the	  DoD	  
procedures.	  	  Other	  exceptions	  for	  retaining	  USPER	  data	  are	  outlined	  in	  Procedure	  3).	  
84	  Id.	  ¶	  at	  C4.2	  (describing	  how	  the	  “performance	  of	  a	  lawful	  government	  function”	  is	  also	  
called	  “Procedure	  4.”	  This	  includes	  DoD	  employees	  and	  contractors;	  Federal,	  State	  or	  local	  
government	  law	  enforcement	  (if	  the	  information	  involves	  activities	  that	  may	  violate	  the	  laws	  
for	  which	  they	  are	  responsible	  to	  enforce);	  intelligence	  agencies;	  authorized	  Federal	  
Government	  agencies	  or	  foreign	  governments	  when	  pursuant	  to	  an	  agreement	  with	  them).	  
85	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  C4.3.	  
86	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  C5.1.2	  (conducting,	  in	  non-­‐emergent	  situations,	  electronic	  surveillance,	  referred	  to	  as	  
a	  “Procedure	  5,”	  may	  only	  be	  conducted	  pursuant	  to	  a	  warrant	  under	  the	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Drones	  at	  Home	  
	  
69	  69	  
missions	  involving	  a	  drone	  outside	  of	  DoD-­‐controlled	  airspace	  require	  approval	  
from	   the	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   (SecDef)	   or	   his	   delegee.87	   	   Conducting	  
surveillance	  on	  specifically	   identified	  USPER	  with	  a	  drone	  is	  prohibited,	  absent	  
explicit	   SecDef	   approval.88	   	   For	   training,	   use	   of	   drones	   outside	   of	   DoD-­‐
controlled	  airspace	  requires	  notification	  to	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  
Staff	   (CJCS).89	   	   This	   notice	   includes	   a	   Proper	   Use	  Memorandum	   (PUM)	   and	   a	  
Federal	   Aviation	   Administration	   (FAA)	   Certificate	   of	   Authorization	   (CoA)	   or	  
license.90	  	  A	  license	  requires	  sufficient	  information	  on	  the	  suspected	  activity	  to	  
permit	   an	   informed	   judgment	   of	   its	   propriety.	   	   Violation	   or	   “questionable	  
activity”	   regarding	   of	   any	   of	   these	   stringent	   directives,	   policies,	   orders,	   or	  
procedures	  may	  trigger	  special	  notifications,	  investigations	  and	  reporting	  to	  the	  
SecDef	  and	  to	  Congress.91	  
	   Collectively,	  these	  mission-­‐centric	  DoD	  IO	  policies	  allows	  drones	  to	  be	  used	  
to	   their	   full	   potential	   while	   also	   protecting	   privacy	   through	   useful	   collection,	  
dissemination,	  retention	  and	  oversight	  processes.	  	  States	  should	  consider	  these	  
policies	  as	  templates	  for	  legislative	  action.	  	  	  
IV. A	  PROPOSED	  MODEL	  FOR	  DRONE	  LEGISLATION	  
	   The	   stated	   purpose	   of	   state	   drone	   legislation	   is	   critical.	   	   A	   logical	   starting	  
point	  for	  analyzing	  any	  drone	  proposal	  is	  to	  review	  its	  purpose.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  
                                                                                                                             
Surveillance	  Act	  of	  1978	  (FISA).	  	  Only	  the	  SecDef,	  DepSecDef,	  the	  Service	  Secretaries	  or	  the	  
Director	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency	  can	  submit	  a	  such	  a	  FISA	  request.	  DoD	  5240.1-­‐R,	  ¶	  C5.1.2.	  
87	  Memorandum	  from	  The	  Sec’y	  of	  Def.,	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  Def.,	  subject:	  Interim	  Guidance	  for	  the	  
Domestic	  Use	  of	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  (28	  Sept.	  2006);	  See	  also	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  INSTR.	  
3025.22,	  THE	  USE	  OF	  THE	  NATIONAL	  GUARD	  FOR	  DEFENSE	  SUPPORT	  OF	  CIVIL	  AUTHORITIES	  (26	  Jul.	  2013),	  
available	  at	  	  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302522p.pdf.	  
88	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  9,6,2.	  
89	  Memorandum	  from	  the	  Sec’y	  of	  Def.	  at	  2.	  	  
90	  Air	  Combat	  Command’s	  (ACC)	  Operations	  Center’s	  Dynamic/Immediate	  ISR/Non-­‐Traditional	  
ISR	  Request	  (DIIR)	  includes	  these	  requirements	  in	  an	  8-­‐line	  Request	  form	  for	  U.S.	  Missions	  and	  
Off-­‐Installation	  Training.	  The	  ACC	  8-­‐line	  is	  available	  at	  	  
https://acc.eim.acc.af.mil/org/A3/A3O/A3O3OP/default.aspx.	  	  PUMs	  are	  required	  by	  
regulation	  and	  signed	  by	  an	  officer	  in	  a	  position	  of	  authority,	  normally	  after	  legal	  review,	  who	  
certifies	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  proposed	  DI	  requirements	  and	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  use	  
parameters	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  and	  policy	  compliance.	  AFI	  14-­‐104,	  ¶	  9.5,	  Attachment	  1	  Terms	  and	  
Attachment	  4.	  Additionally,	  airborne	  assets	  used	  for	  training	  in	  conjunction	  with	  ground	  forces	  
“off	  federal	  real	  property”	  also	  have	  unique	  approval	  authorities	  and	  notification	  procedures	  
based	  on	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  event.	  	  DoDI	  1322.28,	  Realistic	  Military	  Training	  (RMT)	  
Off	  Federal	  Real	  Property.	  	  DoDI	  1322.28,	  supra.	  
91	  See	  DoD	  5240-­‐1R	  and	  DepSecDef	  Directive-­‐Type	  Memorandum	  (DTM)	  08-­‐052	  –	  DoD	  
Guidance	  for	  Reporting	  Questionable	  Intelligence	  Activities	  and	  Significant	  or	  Highly	  Sensitive	  
Matters	  (June	  17,	  2009),	  available	  at	  	  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-­‐08-­‐
052.pdf,	  which	  outlines	  required	  information	  for	  such	  QIA	  reports.	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the	  state	  drone	  bills	  introduced	  thus	  far	  purport	  to	  protect	  citizens’	  privacy	  and	  
bolster	  the	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  “unwarranted”	  surveillance.	  	  To	  do	  this,	  states	  
restrict	   law	  enforcement	  drones	  use	   for	   collecting	  and	  gathering	   information.	  	  	  
These	   restrictions	   are	   generally	   prohibitive	   unless	   a	  warrant	   is	   obtained	   or	   a	  
stated	   exception	   applies.	   	   These	   restrictions	   are	   reinforced	   by	   significant	  
penalties	   for	   violations,	   which	   may	   even	   include	   criminal	   liability	   for	   law	  
enforcement	  officers.	  	  	  
	   Many	  drone	  bills	  contain	  language	  that	  policy	  makers	  should	  pursue.	  	  Many	  
however,	   miss	   the	   mark	   in	   their	   stated	   purpose	   which	   will	   have	   significant	  
second	   and	   third	   order	   impacts.	   	   They	   selectively	   revise	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
Constitutional	   and	   judicial	   protections	   that	   are	   already	   in	   place	   for	   criminal	  
matters.	   	   Worse	   yet,	   some	   take	   a	   cookie	   cutter	   approach	   in	   applying	   these	  
criminal	   law	   processes	   to	   drone	   users	   regardless	   of	  whether	   the	   information	  
collected	  is	  for	  a	  law	  enforcement,	  intelligence,	  or	  legitimate	  military	  purpose.	  	  
Often,	  the	  penalty	  is	  disproportional	  to	  the	  violation.	  	  Finally,	  many	  bills	  fail	  to	  
adequately	   focus	   on	   the	   privacy-­‐centric	   issues	   of	   collection,	   retention,	   and	  
dissemination.	   	   The	   collective	   result	   of	   these	   disjointed	   state	   policies	   is	   that	  
suspects	  will	  likely	  benefit	  from	  procedural	  windfalls;	  lives	  and	  property	  may	  be	  
lost	   for	   fear	   of	   personal	   liability;	   and	  military	   training	   and	   operations	  will	   be	  
degraded	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   our	   greater	   society.	   	   This	   section	   of	   the	   article	  
elaborates	   on	   these	   flaws	   and	   provides	   guiding	   principles	   for	   future	   drone	  
legislation.	  
A. Principle	  #1:	  	  Apply	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  As	  Written	  –	  
	   Agnostically	  
	   The	   Fourth	   Amendment	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution	   should	   be	   applied	   as	  
written	   and	   as	   interpreted	   by	   the	   courts.	   	   All	   state	   bills	   reviewed	   apply	   to	  
government	   actors,	   primarily	   to	   law	   enforcement.	   	   All	   the	   bills,	   except	   that	  
from	  Nebraska,	  prohibit	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  from	  using	  drones	  to	  gather	  
evidence	   absent	   a	   warrant	   or	   court	   order	   or	   in	   other	   limited,	   and	   generally	  
exigent,	   circumstances.	   	   While	   on	   the	   surface	   these	   procedures	   appear	   to	  
provide	   new	   privacy	   protections,	   in	   reality,	   they	   merely	   reiterate	   Fourth	  
Amendment,	   Constitutional	   and	   jurisprudential	   protections	   that	   already	   exist.	  	  
The	   troubling	   point	   here	   is	   that	   many	   drone	   bills	   selectively	   choose	   to	   use	  
some,	  but	  not	  all,	  Fourth	  Amendment	  principles.	  	  Although	  state	  legislation	  can	  
place	  restrictions	  on	  government	  action	   in	  addition	  to	  what	   is	  constitutionally	  
required,	   the	  question	  here	   is	  why?	   The	   answer	   appears	   to	  be	   the	  mere	   fact	  
that	  the	  tool	  used	  for	  the	  search	  is	  a	  drone.	   	  The	  result	  of	  selectively	  applying	  
Fourth	   Amendment	   principles	   leads	   to	   unnecessary	   privacy	   restrictions	   and	  
decreased	  safety	  protections.	  The	  solution	   is	   to	  apply	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  
2013]	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agnostically,	   just	  as	   it	   is	  written	   in	  the	  Constitution	  and	  applied	  by	  the	  courts.	  	  
The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  provides:	  
The	   right	   of	   the	   people	   to	   be	   secure	   in	   their	   persons,	   houses,	   papers,	   and	  
effects,	  against	  unreasonable	  searches	  and	  seizures	  shall	  not	  be	  violated	  and	  
no	   warrants	   shall	   issue,	   but	   upon	   probable	   cause,	   supported	   by	   Oath	   or	  
affirmation,	   and	   particularly	   describing	   the	   place	   to	   be	   searched	   and	   the	  
persons	  or	  things	  to	  be	  seized…92	  
	   The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  warrant	  requirement	  applies	  to	  government	  action	  
that	  amounts	  to	  a	  search.	   	  The	  test	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  search	  has	  
occurred	  (or	  will	  occur)	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  
in	  Katz	   v.	  United	   States:	   	  whether	   the	  person	  has	   a	   subjective	   expectation	  of	  
privacy	   in	   the	   area	   to	   be	   searched	   and	  whether	   society	   is	   prepared	   to	   deem	  
that	   expectation	   reasonable.93	   If	   the	   answer	   to	   the	   Katz	   questions	   are	   both	  
affirmative,	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   requires	   the	   government	   to	   obtain	   a	  
warrant,	  unless	  a	  specifically	  established	  and	  well-­‐delineated	  exception	  to	  the	  
warrant	  requirement	  applies.94	   	   	  These	  exceptions	   include,	  but	  are	  not	   limited	  
to,	   exigent	   circumstances,	   consent	   searches,	   and	   plain	   view.95	   	   The	   Supreme	  
Court	  has	  deemed	  exigent	  circumstances	  exist	  in	  the	  case	  of	  imminent	  danger	  
to	   life,	   where	   a	   felon	   or	   suspect	   is	   fleeing	   and	   where	   the	   destruction	   of	  
evidence	  is	  imminent.96	  
	   The	   remedy	   for	   violating	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   is	   the	   exclusionary	   rule	  
and	   its	   corollary,	   the	   fruit	   of	   the	   poisonous	   tree	   doctrine.97	   	   The	   fruit	   of	   the	  
                                                
92
	  U.S.	  CONST.	  amend	  IV.	  	  The	  focus	  will	  remain	  on	  the	  U.S.	  CONST.,	  which	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  
federal	  government,	  but	  which	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  states	  through	  the	  Due	  Process	  clause	  
of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  through	  the	  selective	  incorporation	  doctrine.	  
93	  Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  347,	  351	  (1967).	  
94	  Id.	  
95	  See	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  Hampshire,	  403	  U.S.	  443,	  474-­‐75	  (1920)(“[I]t	  is	  accepted,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  principle,	  that	  a	  search	  or	  seizure	  carried	  out	  on	  a	  suspect’s	  premises	  without	  a	  
warrant	  is	  per	  se	  unreasonable,	  unless	  the	  police	  can	  show	  that	  it	  falls	  within	  one	  of	  a	  carefully	  
defined	  set	  of	  exceptions	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘exigent	  circumstances’”);	  	  Schmerber	  v.	  
California,	  384	  U.S.	  757	  (1966);	  consent,	  Schneckloth	  v.	  Bustamonte,	  412	  U.S.	  218	  (1973)	  and	  
for	  plain	  view	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  aerial	  surveillance,	  California	  v.	  Ciraolo,	  476	  U.S.	  207,	  213	  
(1986);Florida	  v.	  Riley,	  488	  U.S.	  445,	  448	  (1989).	  
96	  Warden,	  Maryland	  Penitentiary	  v.	  Hayden,	  387	  U.S.	  294,	  298-­‐99	  (1967)(“The	  Fourth	  
Amendment	  does	  not	  require	  police	  officers	  to	  delay	  in	  the	  course	  of	  an	  investigation	  if	  to	  do	  
so	  would	  gravely	  endanger	  their	  lives	  or	  the	  lives	  of	  others”);	  	  Tennessee	  v.	  Garner,	  471	  U.S.	  1	  
(1985)(law	  enforcement	  may	  us	  non-­‐lethal	  force	  to	  deter	  a	  fleeing	  felon);	  Roaden	  v.	  Kentucky,	  
413	  U.S.	  496,	  505	  (1973)(“Where	  there	  are	  exigent	  circumstances	  in	  which	  police	  action	  
literally	  must	  be	  ‘now	  or	  never’	  to	  preserve	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  crime,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
permit	  action	  without	  prior	  judicial	  evaluation”).	  
97	  The	  seminal	  case	  on	  the	  exclusionary	  rule	  is	  Weeks	  v.	  United	  States,	  232	  U.S.	  383	  (1914)	  and	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poisonous	   tree	   doctrine	   extends	   the	   exclusionary	   rule	   to	   evidence	   that	   was	  
illegally	   obtained.98	   	   The	   stated	   purpose	   of	   the	   exclusionary	   rule,	   and	   its	  
corollary	  doctrine,	   is	   to	  deter	  police	   from	  engaging	   in	  misconduct,	   or	   at	   least	  
conduct	  that	  violates	  our	  Constitution.	  	  
	   Just	   as	   the	   warrant	   requirement	   has	   exceptions,	   so	   too	   does	   the	  
exclusionary	  rule.	  	  The	  good	  faith	  exception	  permits	  the	  admission	  of	  evidence	  
that	  law	  enforcement,	  in	  good	  faith,	  gathered	  based	  on	  a	  warrant	  that	  is	  later	  
deemed	   facially	   invalid.99	   The	   rationale	   being	   that	   excluding	   evidence	   where	  
there	  was	  no	   law	  enforcement	  misconduct	  would	  not	  advance	  the	  purpose	  of	  
the	   exclusionary	   rule,	   which	   is	   to	   deter.	   	   Likewise,	   the	   inevitable	   discovery	  
doctrine	   allows	   evidence	   to	   be	   admitted	   if	   the	   evidence	   would	   have	   been	  
discovered	   “inevitably”	   by	   other	   lawful	   means.100	   	   The	   rationale	   for	   this	  
doctrine	   is	   the	   same	   as	   that	   for	   the	   good	   faith	   doctrine.	   Accordingly,	   police	  
misconduct	  is	  not	  deterred	  where	  the	  prosecution	  is	  in	  no	  better	  position	  than	  
it	  would	  have	  been	  absent	  law	  enforcement’s	  conduct.	  
	   State	   drone	   privacy	   policies	   should	   be	   consistent	   with	   well-­‐established	  
privacy	   laws.	   	  The	  requirement	  that	   law	  enforcement	  obtain	  a	  warrant	  before	  
searching	   for	   evidence	  where	   there	   is	   a	   reasonable	   expectation	   of	   privacy	   is	  
well	   established.	   	   	   Similarly,	   permitting	   law	   enforcement	   to	   search	  without	   a	  
warrant	  in	  exigent	  circumstances,	  where	  there	  is	  consent	  or	  where	  information	  
is	  in	  plain	  view	  constitutes	  Black-­‐letter	  law.	  	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  drones,	  
states	   unevenly	   apply	   these	   well-­‐established	   Fourth	   Amendment	   principles.	  	  
Case	  in	  point,	  the	  least	  common	  exception	  in	  any	  drone	  bill	  is	  an	  explicit	  proviso	  
to	   permit	   drone	   use	   where	   “judicially	   recognized	   exceptions	   to	   the	   warrant	  
requirement”	   would	   otherwise	   apply.	   Likewise,	   less	   than	   a	   quarter	   of	   states	  
would	   permit	   law	   enforcement	   to	   use	   a	   drone	   even	   when	   a	   suspect	   has	  
consented,	   despite	   longstanding	   Fourth	   Amendment	   jurisprudence	   that	  
consent	  constitutes	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement.	  
	   Bills	   such	   as	   those	   from	   Arizona,	   Indiana,	   Kansas,	   Nebraska,	   New	   Jersey,	  
Pennsylvania,	   and	   West	   Virginia	   fail	   to	   include	   an	   imminent	   danger	   to	   life	  
exception	   and	   very	   few	   states	   carve	   out	   exceptions	   for	   search	   and	   rescue	  
operations	   or	   natural	   disaster	   response	   assessment.101	   Several	   state	   bills	   that	  
                                                                                                                             
as	  applicable	  to	  State	  authorities,	  Mapp	  v.	  Ohio,	  367	  U.S.	  643	  (1961).	  	  “Fruit	  of	  the	  poisonous	  
tree”	  doctrine	  was	  first	  applied	  in	  Silverthorne	  Lumber	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  et	  al.	  v.	  United	  States,	  251	  U.S.	  
358	  (1920)	  (copies	  of	  tax	  records	  were	  ruled	  inadmissible	  for	  being	  derivative	  of	  illegally	  seized	  
evidence).	  
98	  Silverthorne,	  251	  U.S.	  385;	  Mapp,367	  U.S.	  643..	  
99	  United	  States	  v.	  Leon,	  468	  U.S.	  897	  (1984).	  	  Generally,	  facially	  invalid	  warrants	  are	  ones	  that	  
lacked	  sufficient	  probable	  cause	  by	  mistake,	  as	  opposed	  to	  law	  enforcement’s	  
misrepresentation.	  
100	  Nix	  v.	  Williams,	  467	  U.S.	  431	  (1984).	  
101	  See	  supra	  notes	  28	  &	  31.	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include	   an	   emergency	   response	   exception	   then	   require	   law	   enforcement	   to	  
obtain	  a	  judicial	  warrant	  within	  48	  hours	  after-­‐the-­‐fact.	  	  Presumably	  all	  of	  these	  
states	  would	  permit	  their	  law	  enforcement	  to	  fly	  a	  helicopter	  with	  a	  full	  motion	  
video	   capability	   in	   the	   same	   exact	   circumstances,	   and	   without	   these	  
procedures.	  	  	  
	   The	  seventy-­‐seven	  state	  proposals	   that	  would	  require	  a	  warrant	   to	  view	  a	  
person	  walking	   in	   an	   open	   or	   public	   field	  with	   a	   drone	   erode	   the	   plain	   view	  
doctrine.	   	  Specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  domestic	  aerial	  surveillance	  with	  manned	  
aircraft	   flying	   within	   navigable	   airspace,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   held	   this	   is	  
tantamount	  to	  the	  plain	  or	  public	  view	  exception,	  for	  which	  a	  search	  warrant	  is	  
not	  required.102	  	  This	  same	  logic	  would,	  and	  should,	  apply	  to	  unmanned	  aircraft.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  states	  like	  Arkansas	  and	  eight	  like-­‐minded	  others	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  
include	   a	   public	   land	   exception	   speaks	   volumes	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
legislators	   have	   selectively	   chosen	   to	   utilize	   long-­‐held	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
principles.103	   In	   short,	   the	   full	   panoply	   of	   Fourth	   Amendment	   requirements	  
should	  apply	  to	  drone	  use	  for	  law	  enforcement	  purposes.	  
	   Admittedly,	   drones	   are	   an	  emerging	   technology	   and	   there	  may	  be	   special	  
considerations	   in	   their	   use,	   as	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   alluded	   to	   in	   the	   United	  
States	  v.	  Jones	  and	  Kyllo	  v.	  United	  States	  decisions.104	  	  Potential	  reasonableness	  
factors	   that	  emerge	   from	   these	  cases	   include:	   review	  of	  exact	   location	  of	   the	  
search,	   such	  as	  a	  home,	  open	   spaces,	   and	  public	  places;	   the	   sophistication	  of	  
the	   technology	   used;	   whether	   commonly	   available	   or	   pre-­‐technology;	   the	  
length	   of	   time	   an	   individual	   is	   kept	   under	   surveillance	   or	   duration	   of	   the	  
activity;	   pervasiveness	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   breadth	   of	   data	   collected	   through	  
surveillance;	   as	   well	   as	   society’s	   conception	   of	   privacy	   and	   fairness.105	   	   This	  
focus	  on	  time,	  place,	  and	  manner	   is	  much	  a	  more	  constructive	  path	  for	  drone	  
legislators	  than	  whole-­‐cloth	  or	  piecemeal	  revision	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  	  	  
	   State	   restrictions	   that	   protect	   non-­‐public	   places	   from	   law	   enforcement’s	  
intrusion	  on	  private	  areas,	  such	  as	   the	  home	  and	  the	  curtilage	  surrounding	   it,	  
                                                
102	  See	  California	  v.	  Ciraolo,	  476	  U.S.	  207,	  213	  (1986);	  Florida	  v.	  Riley,	  488	  U.S.	  445,	  448	  (1989).	  
103	  See	  sources	  cited	  supra	  note	  43	  (regarding	  public	  land	  use	  exceptions).	  
104	  Kyllo	  v.	  United	  States,	  533	  U.S.	  27,	  29-­‐30	  (2001)	  (Government	  agents’	  use	  of	  thermal	  
imaging	  while	  standing	  outside	  a	  house	  to	  infer	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  house	  constituted	  a	  
search;	  technology	  not	  in	  “general	  public	  use”	  enabled	  the	  government	  to	  gather	  information	  
about	  activities	  inside	  the	  home	  that	  would	  not	  have	  otherwise	  been	  obtainable	  except	  by	  
entering	  the	  home.);	  United	  States	  v.	  Jones,	  132	  S.Ct.	  945	  (2012)	  (Government	  agents	  placed	  a	  
global	  positioning	  system	  (GPS)	  on	  a	  car	  and	  tracked	  the	  car’s	  movements	  over	  a	  period	  of	  a	  
month,	  constituting	  an	  unreasonable	  search.	  Justice	  Alito	  concurred	  but	  said	  the	  reasonable	  
expectation	  was	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  government	  used	  “pre-­‐technology”	  –	  a	  technology	  
that	  the	  government	  had,	  but	  that	  others	  did	  not.)	  
105	  Richard	  A.	  Thompson	  III,	  Legis.	  Att’y,	  Cong.	  Research	  Services	  Rep.,	  Drones	  in	  Domestic	  
Surveillance	  Operations:	  Fourth	  Amendment	  Implications	  and	  Legislative	  Responses	  (Sept.	  6,	  2012).	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are	   consistent	   with	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment’s	   protections,	   and	   frankly,	   are	  
expected.106	   	   The	  48-­‐hour	  operational	   execution	  windows	  arguably	   constitute	  
reasonable	  duration	  limitations.107	  	  The	  manner	  of	  clearly	  marking	  the	  drone	  as	  
required	   by	   both	   California	   and	  Michigan	  makes	   sense	   if	   the	   aircraft	   is	   not	   a	  
classified	   test	   prototype.108	   	   Oregon,	   for	   example,	   has	   taken	   an	   approach	   to	  
drone	   legislation	   that	   should	   be	   emulated.	   	   In	   Oregon	   the	   legislature	   has	  
directed	  its	  agencies	  to	  adopt	  policies	  that	  focus	  on	  drone	  use.	  	  These	  policies	  
are	   akin	   to	   DoD	   policies	   that	   establish	   training	   requirements	   for	   operators,	  
criteria	   for	  drone	  use,	  descriptions	  of	   the	  areas	   in	  which	  drones	  will	  be	  used,	  
and	  procedures	  for	  informing	  the	  public	  of	  these	  policies.109	  	  Likewise,	  as	  will	  be	  
discussed,	   the	   few	   States	   that	   focus	   on	   regulating	   the	   manner	   of	   collection,	  
retention	  and	  dissemination,	  are	  on	  the	  right	  track.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  those	  
that	   distort	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   protecting	   personal	  
liberties	  erodes	  the	  very	  liberties	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  preserve.	  
	  
B. Principle	  #2:	  	  Take	  a	  Nuanced	  Approach	  to	  
	   	   	  Operational	  Purpose	  
	   States	   must	   consider	   the	   impact	   on	   law	   enforcement,	   the	   intelligence	  
community	  and	  the	  DoD	  before	  passing	  drone	  legislation.	  	  A	  nuanced	  approach	  
would	   not	   just	   differentiate	   between	   different	   actors,	   it	   would	   both	   permit	  
drone	  use	  across	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  operations	  and	  protect	  personal	  privacy.	  	  
Before	   discussing	   collection,	   dissemination,	   and	   retention	   regimes,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   appreciate	   that	   different	   agencies	   have	   different	   purposes	   for	  
collecting	   information,	   whether	   using	   a	   drone	   or	   not.	   	   Law	   enforcement,	  
                                                
106	  See	  sources	  cited	  supra	  note	  51	  (detailing	  a	  list	  of	  place	  restrictions).	  
107	  S.B.	  783,	  27th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  1,	  ¶	  (3)(B)(Haw.	  2013)	  (allowing	  the	  ability	  to	  receive	  a	  
judicial	  order	  to	  operate	  drone	  for	  “no	  period	  greater	  than	  48	  hours”	  and	  within	  30	  days	  of	  
issuance);	  S.B.	  1587,	  2013	  Leg.,	  98th	  Sess.,	  §	  15(2)-­‐(3)	  (Ill.	  2013)	  (describing	  that	  a	  search	  
warrant	  “limited	  to	  period	  of	  45	  days”	  and	  renewable;	  emergency	  operations	  limited	  to	  48	  
hours);	  S.P.	  72,	  126th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Me.	  2013)	  (amending	  §	  1,	  25	  MRSA	  Pt.	  12,	  §	  4502.2.	  
E	  (court	  order…”may	  not	  allow	  operation	  for	  a	  period	  greater	  than	  48	  hours”…but	  not	  to	  
exceed	  30	  days));	  H.B.	  4455,	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  5(d)	  (Mich.	  2013)	  (enforcing	  court	  orders	  
valid	  for	  48	  hours,	  with	  possibility	  of	  extension	  up	  to	  30	  days);	  H.B.	  312,	  2013	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  
Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  2(3)(c)(b)	  (N.C.	  2013)	  (“no	  later	  than	  48	  hours”	  from	  the	  date	  drone	  was	  used);	  
H.B.	  1771,	  63rd	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  6.(4)	  (Wash.	  2013)	  (“Warrants	  shall	  not	  be	  issued	  for	  a	  
[surveillance]	  period	  greater	  than	  48	  hours…for	  no	  longer	  than	  30	  days	  ”).	  
108	  H.B.	  4455,	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  3(5)	  (Mich.	  2013);	  S.B.	  15,	  2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013)	  
(amending	  Penal	  Code	  §	  14356).	  
109	  H.B.	  2710,	  77th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  1.(7)(a)-­‐(d)	  (Or.	  2013)	  (showing	  how	  similarly,	  Va.	  H.B.	  
2012,	  §	  1.1	  requires	  the	  Va.	  Department	  of	  Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Office	  of	  AG	  to	  develop	  “model	  
protocols	  for	  use	  of	  UAS	  by	  LEA	  and	  report	  findings	  to	  the	  Governor	  and	  General	  Assembly”	  by	  
November	  1,	  2013).	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intelligence,	  and	  military	  training	  operations	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  	  A	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐
all	  approach	  should	  be	  eschewed	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  nuanced	  one.	  
	   The	   intelligence	   community	   (IC)	   and	   law	   enforcement	   have	   different	  
focuses.	   	   Law	   enforcement	   focuses	   on	   criminal	   evidence-­‐gathering	   in	  
furtherance	  of	  punishing	  past	  acts;	   the	  purpose	  of	   intelligence	  collection	   is	   to	  
prevent	  future	  ones.110	  	  The	  IC	  needs	  “to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  more	  than	  connect	  the	  
dots	  when	  we	  happen	  to	  find	  them;	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  find	  the	  right	  dots	  in	  
the	  first	  place.”111	   	   It	   is	   for	  this	  reason	  that,	  while	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  still	  
applies,	  the	  IC,	  including	  the	  DoD	  IC,	  has	  its	  own	  legal	  framework	  that	  includes	  
and	  IO	  policies	  discussed	  above.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  drone	  proposals	  like	  those	  
in	  California,	  Hawaii,	  Missouri,	  Rhode	  Island,	  Washington	  and	  others	  apply	  to	  all	  
persons	  or	  U.S.	  officers,	  they	  fail	  to	  distinguish	  between	  law	  enforcement	  and	  
intelligence	  paradigms.112	  	  This	  matters.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  California,	  Senate	  Bill	  
15,	  which	  is	  currently	  under	  advisement,	  states	  “an	  unmanned	  aircraft	  system	  
may	   not	   be	   equipped	  with	   a	  weapon.”	   	   Doing	   so	   is	   punishable	   by	   a	   fine	   and	  
imprisonment.113	  	  The	  proposal	  contains	  no	  military	  exemption,	  yet	  California	  is	  
replete	  with	  military	   ranges,	   bases	   and	   test	   sites	   for	   the	   Active,	   Reserve	   and	  
Guard	  components	  of	  virtually	  all	  the	  military	  Services.114	  
                                                
110	  William	  Lietzau,	  Deputy	  Assistant	  U.S.	  Sec’y	  of	  Def.	  for	  Detainee	  Policy,	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  
Detention	  for	  Terrorists	  (Feb.	  18,	  2011),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/02/18_understanding-­‐detention-­‐predicting-­‐
prosecutions.html.	  
111	  Robert	  S.	  Litt,	  ODNI	  Gen.	  Counsel,	  Office	  of	  the	  Dir.	  Of	  Nat’l	  Intelligence,	  Privacy,	  	  
Technology	  and	  National	  Security:	  	  An	  Overview	  of	  Intelligence	  Collection	  (Jul.	  19,	  2013),	  
available	  at	  	  http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-­‐and-­‐interviews/195-­‐
speeches-­‐interviews-­‐2013/896-­‐privacy,-­‐technology-­‐and-­‐national-­‐security-­‐an-­‐overview-­‐of-­‐
intelligence-­‐collection.	  
112	  See	  supra	  note	  11	  (citing	  drone	  proposals).	  	  
113	  S.B.	  15,	  §	  14351	  (Cal.	  2013).	  
114	  See	  Thomas	  J.	  McLaughlin,	  Mary	  P.	  Gaston,	  and	  Jared	  D.	  Hager,	  Navigating	  the	  Nation’s	  
Waterways	  and	  Airways:	  	  Maritime	  Lessons	  for	  Federal	  Preemption	  Airworthiness	  Standards,	  
23	  THE	  AIR	  &	  SPACE	  LAWYER	  2	  (2010),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/10_27_ABAArticle.pdf;	  See	  also	  City	  of	  Burbank	  v.	  
Lockheed	  Air	  Terminal,	  411	  U.S.	  624,	  639,	  93	  S.Ct.	  1854,	  36	  L.Ed.2d	  547	  (1973)	  and	  Northwest	  
Airlines	  v.	  Minnesota,	  322	  U.S.	  292,	  303,	  64	  S.Ct.	  950,	  88	  L.Ed.	  1283	  (1944)	  (Jackson,	  J.,	  
concurring).	  	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  State	  drone	  laws	  are	  pre-­‐empted	  by	  federal	  law.	  The	  topic	  
of	  federal	  pre-­‐emption	  of	  State	  drone	  law's	  merits	  its	  own	  article	  and	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  one.	  	  Even	  assuming	  pre-­‐emption	  applies,	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  a	  federal	  officer	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  summoned	  into	  court,	  request	  DoJ	  substitution	  or	  representation,	  and	  then	  litigates	  
pre-­‐emption.	  	  The	  better	  course	  of	  action	  would	  be	  for	  States	  to	  exclude	  federal	  officers	  from	  
their	  laws	  from	  the	  inception,	  especially	  the	  U.S.	  military.	  Apparently,	  numerous	  States	  believe	  
they	  can	  legislate	  federal	  and	  military	  actors’	  drone	  use.	  	  However,	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  a	  
plausible	  argument	  for	  preemption	  would	  be	  that	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Act	  (FAA)	  of	  1958,	  its	  
supplements,	  including	  the	  2012	  FAA	  Modernization	  and	  Reform	  Act,	  when	  combined	  with	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   Whether	   or	   not	   state	   drone	   laws	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   apply	   to	   the	   DoD,	  
most	  state	  proposals	  will	  nevertheless	  impact	  military	  training	  and	  operations.	  	  
By	  way	  of	  example,	  Air	  Force	  Instruction	  (AFI)	  14-­‐104,	  Oversight	  of	  Intelligence	  
Activities,	   requires	   Air	   Force	   intelligence	   components	   to	   report	   “incidentally	  
acquired	   information…	  reasonably	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	   law,”	  whether	  
Federal,	   State,	   local	   or	   foreign,	   to	   the	   appropriate	   civilian	   law	   enforcement	  
agency,	   through	   the	  Air	   Force	  Office	  of	   Special	   Investigations	   (AFOSI).115	   	   The	  
AFI	   also	   requires	   reporting	   of	   incidentally	   acquired	   information	   relating	   to	  
“potential	   threats	   to	   life	  or	  property	   (whether	  DoD	  personnel,	   installations	  or	  
activities,	   or	   civilian	   lives	   or	   property)…”	   to	   “appropriate	   authorities.”116	   	   It	   is	  
not	  difficult	   to	   imagine	  a	  case	   in	  which	  a	  United	  Sates	  Air	  Force	  (USAF)	  drone	  
incidentally	  acquires	   information	  about	   threats	  or	   the	  commission	  of	  a	  crime.	  	  
In	   a	   State	   that	   prohibits	   local	   law	   enforcement	   agencies	   from	   receiving	  
information	  or	  evidence	  acquired	  by	  a	  drone,	  such	  as	  MI	  House	  Bill	  4455,	   the	  
service	  would	   be	   forced	   to	   violate	   its	   own	   regulations.117	   	  More	   disturbingly,	  
lawfully	  acquired	  information	  relating	  to	  a	  threat	  or	  crime	  might	  go	  unheeded	  
by	  State	  agencies	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  action.	  	  	  
	   These	  are	  but	  a	  few	  reasons	  why	  a	  military	  exemption	  is	  critical.	  	  Yet,	  with	  
one	  notable	  exception,	  the	  language	  contained	  in	  the	  bills	  that	  thus	  far	  address	  
the	   topic	   do	   not	   go	   far	   enough.	   	   By	   focusing	   on	   the	   National	   Guard,	   the	  
Washington	  and	  Virginia	  bills	  neglect	  to	  address	  the	  Total	  Force	  as	  defined	  by	  
Secretary	   of	   Defense,	   James	   Schlesinger,118	   including	   the	   Active	   Duty	   and	  
                                                                                                                             
comprehensive	  FAA	  regulations	  found	  at	  14	  CFR	  illustrate	  Congress’s	  intent	  that	  the	  FAA	  
occupy	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  aircraft	  safety.	  	  
115
	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  AIR	  FORCE,	  INSTR.	  14-­‐104,	  OVERSIGHT	  OF	  INTELLIGENCE	  ACTIVITIES,	  ¶	  11.12.1,	  11.12.2.2	  
(Apr.	  23,	  2012),	  available	  at	  	  http://static.e-­‐
publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a2/publication/afi14-­‐104.pdf.	  
116	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  12.	  
117	  H.B.	  4455,	  97th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.,	  §	  3(3)	  (Mich.	  2013)	  (“Except	  as	  provided	  in	  section	  5,	  a	  law	  
enforcement	  agency	  of	  this	  state	  or	  a	  political	  subdivision	  of	  this	  state	  shall	  not	  disclose	  or	  
receive	  information	  acquired	  through	  the	  operation	  of	  an	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicle.”	  	  Section	  5	  
of	  the	  bill	  contains	  exceptions	  based	  upon	  consent,	  imminent	  threat	  to	  life,	  search	  warrant,	  
court	  order	  or	  for	  non-­‐evidentiary	  or	  non-­‐intelligence	  purposes.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  why	  a	  
law	  enforcement	  agency	  would	  want	  to	  receive	  drone	  information	  that	  has	  no	  evidentiary	  or	  
intelligence	  value).	  
118	  Sec’y.	  of	  Def.	  James	  Schlesinger	  declared	  the	  Total	  Force	  concept	  as	  policy	  in	  1973,	  which	  
included	  the	  comparable	  structuring	  of	  units,	  equal	  training	  and	  evaluation	  standards	  for	  
active	  and	  reserve	  forces,	  and	  an	  integrated	  approach	  to	  equipping,	  supporting,	  and	  exercising	  
all	  units.	  See	  AIR	  FORCE	  RESERVE	  COMMAND	  HISTORY,	  1969-­‐1989,	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.afrc.af.mil/library/history/1969-­‐1989/index.asp.	  	  Lt.	  Col.	  USAF,	  Richard	  Toner,	  A	  
Total	  Force	  Concept:	  	  An	  Air	  Force	  View,	  AIR	  U.	  REV.	  (June	  1,	  2004),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1972/nov-­‐dec/toner.html.	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Reserve	   components.119	   	   New	   Jersey’s	   “disorderly	   persons	   offense”	   for	   the	  
purchase,	  ownership	  or	  possession	  of	  a	  drone	  exempts	  the	  Total	  Force	  “while	  
on	   duty	   or	   traveling	   to	   or	   from	   an	   authorized	   place	   of	   duty;”	   but	   military	  
members	   do	   not	   “possess	   or	   own	   drones,”	   they	   operate	   them.120	   The	  
Oklahoma	  bill,	  which	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  Total	  Force,	  protects	  military	  equities	  
by	   specifically	   allowing	   armed	   drones,	   over-­‐flight	   of	   private	   land	   between	  
military	  installations	  and	  testing	  and	  training	  over	  public	  land.121	  It	  also	  permits	  
the	  military	  to	  test	  and	  train	  with	  weaponized	  drones.	  	  States	  that	  prohibit	  this	  
create	  a	  huge	  barrier	   for	  statutorily	  mandated	  military	   requirements.122	   	  Even	  
the	  Oklahoma	   bill,	  which	   is	   the	  most	   permissive	   towards	  military	   operations,	  
precludes	  drone	  use	  across	  the	  potential	   full	   range	  of	  DoD	  missions,	   including	  
DSCA,	  SAR,	  support	   to	  civil	   law	  enforcement,	  and	  force	  protection,	   to	  name	  a	  
few.	  	  
	   Oregon’s	  approach	  strikes	  the	  right	  balance	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  DoD	  and	  is	  
worth	  emulating	  as	  regards	  to	  its	  military	  exemption.	  	  It	  explicitly	  exempts	  the	  
“United	  States	  Armed	  Forces,”	  defined	  as	  including:	  	  the	  Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  
Marine	  Corps	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  Reserve	  components	  of	  
the	  Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  Marine	  Corps	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  
and	  the	  National	  Guard	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Oregon	  National	  Guard.123	  
By	  exempting	  the	  Total	  Force	  from	  its	  drone	  bill	  provisions,	  Oregon	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  few	  states	  that	  permits	  critical	  military	  training	  to	  occur	  unimpeded	  and	  
bolsters	  readiness	  for	  combat	  and	  other	  missions.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  “one-­‐size-­‐
fits-­‐all”	  state	  approach	  which	  fails	  distinguish	  between	  drone	  users	  has	  
unintended	  consequences	  for	  our	  national	  security	  by	  impeding	  critical	  training	  
and	  operations.	  	  	  
	  
C. Principle	  #3:	  	  Renew	  Focus	  on	  Collection,	  	  
	   	   Dissemination	  and	  Retention	  
	   States	  should	  also	  take	  a	  more	  privacy-­‐centric	  approach	  to	  drone	  legislation	  
that	  focuses	  on	  how	  users	  collect	  information,	  with	  who	  they	  may	  share	  it	  and	  
for	   how	   long	   they	   can	   keep	   it.	   	   Some	   state	   bills	   approach	   privacy	   protection	  
through	  collection,	  dissemination,	  retention	  and	  oversight	  rules	  similar	  to,	  but	  
distinguishable	  from,	  DoD	  IO	  policies,	  like	  those	  which	  require	  drone	  operators	  
                                                
119	  Id.	  
120	  S.B.	  3157,	  §	  2.a.,	  Gen.	  Assemb.	  (N.J.	  2012),	  ¶	  5.	  
121	  H.B.	  1556,	  Section	  5.C;	  §	  4.A,	  54th	  Leg.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (Okla.	  2013).	  
122	  See	  footnote	  45,	  supra,	  for	  lethal	  and	  non-­‐lethal	  weapons	  restrictions.	  	  10	  U.S.C.	  §	  8013	  (b)	  
(2010)	  is	  the	  “organize,	  train	  and	  equip”	  authority	  of	  the	  Service	  Secretaries	  and	  charges	  them	  
to	  prepare	  combat-­‐ready	  forces	  to	  aid	  in	  our	  nation’s	  defense.	  
123	  H.B.	  2710,	  §	  16,	  77th	  Sess.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Or.	  2013).	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to	  focus	  on	  the	  target	  of	  the	  collection	  and	  avoid	  or	  minimize	  data	  collection	  on	  
other	  individuals,	  homes,	  or	  areas.124	  This	  is	  a	  positive	  development	  and	  should	  
be	  further	  pursued.	  Like	  the	  DoD,	  some	  also	  address	  retention	  by	  requiring	  the	  
deletion	   of	   information	   improperly	   collected,	   or	   collected	   on	   non-­‐targets.125	  	  
For	  a	   law	  enforcement	  paradigm,	   this	  makes	   sense	  unless	   incidentally,	  within	  
the	   legitimate	   scope	   of	   the	   collection,	   law	   enforcement	   captures	   images	   of	  
another	  crime	   in	  progress.	   	  Envision	  a	  situation	  where	   law	  enforcement	  has	  a	  
drone	  warrant	  to	  image	  a	  drug	  dealer	  but	  then	  cannot	  use	  the	  same	  video	  feed	  
against	  the	  drug	  buyer.	   	  Without	  rehashing	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  discussion	  
above,	  requiring	  the	  deletion	  of	  this	  information	  does	  more	  societal	  harm	  than	  
good.	  	  	  
	   The	  DoD	  IO	  policy’s	  incidental	  collection	  rules	  are	  slightly	  broader	  and	  allow	  
retaining	   images	   of	   criminal	   acts	   captured	   consistent	   with	   official	   records	  
disposition	  schedules.126	   	  USPER	   information	  acquired	   incidentally	   can	  also	  be	  
retained	  for	  up	  to	  ninety	  days	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  a	   legitimate	  purpose	  to	  
keep	   it	  under	   the	   IO	  rules.127	   	  Perhaps	   for	  drone	   legislation,	   the	   line	   to	   retain	  
incidental	   information	   lies	   somewhere	   more	   than	   24	   hours	   but	   less	   than	   90	  
days.	   	   Retention	   criteria	   for	   incidentally	   acquired	   information	   should	   also	  
include	  criminal	  acts.128	  California’s	  provisions	  that	  allow	  images	  to	  be	  kept	  for	  
“training	  purposes”	  is	  a	  necessity	  for	  the	  military	  and	  worth	  repeating.129	  
	   Similarly,	  most	   drone	   bills	   prohibit	   dissemination	   of	   information	   gathered	  
on	  non-­‐targets.	  	  The	  DoD	  IO	  dissemination	  policy,	  that	  USPER	  information	  may	  
be	   disseminated	   to	   limited	   government	   recipients	   for	   the	   “performance	   of	   a	  
lawful	   governmental	   function”	   is	   a	   useful	   approach.130	   Requiring	   extensive	  
approvals	  from	  high-­‐level	  legal	  counsel	  for	  any	  other	  dissemination	  is	  a	  practice	  
that	  can	  be	  duplicated	   in	  equivalent	  State	   legal	  counsel	  offices.131	   In	  addition,	  
many	   bills	   prohibit	   use	   of	   facial	   recognition	   or	   other	   biometric	   matching	  
                                                
124	  See	  footnotes	  48-­‐50,	  supra,	  for	  state	  collection	  restrictions.	  
125	  See	  footnotes	  54-­‐56,	  supra	  for	  retention	  rules.	  
126	  In	  the	  Air	  Force,	  the	  applicable	  instruction	  is	  AFI	  33-­‐364,	  Records	  Disposition	  –	  Procedures	  
and	  Responsibilities	  (Dec.	  22,	  2006),	  available	  at	  	  http://www.e-­‐publishing.af.mil/index.asp	  by	  
reference	  to	  its	  number.	  
127	  DoD	  5240.1-­‐R,	  ¶	  C3.3.4.	  One	  legitimate	  reason	  to	  retain	  incidental	  information	  would	  be	  
where	  it	  indicates	  involvement	  in	  activities	  that	  may	  violate	  federal,	  state,	  local,	  or	  foreign	  law.	  
Other	  exceptions	  for	  retaining	  USPER	  data	  are	  outlined	  in	  Procedure	  3.	  
128	  S.B.	  1587,	  §	  25.	  (Ill.	  2013),	  permits	  a	  supervisor	  to	  disclose	  to	  another	  government	  agency	  
information	  collected	  if	  there	  is	  reasonable	  suspicion	  it	  contains	  evidence	  of	  a	  crime	  or	  is	  
relevant	  to	  ongoing	  investigation	  or	  pending	  criminal	  trial	  (and	  thus	  retain	  at	  least	  for	  this	  
purpose).	  
129	  H.B.	  1327,	  2013	  Assemb.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ca.	  2012).	  
130	  DoD	  5240.1-­‐R,	  ¶	  C4.2.,	  also	  called	  “Procedure	  4.”	  
131	  Id.	  ¶	  C4.3.	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technology	  on	  non-­‐target	  information.132	  	  This	  may	  be	  understandable	  in	  a	  law	  
enforcement	   context,	   but	   in	   an	   intelligence	   environment,	   this	   is	   unduly	  
restrictive.	   	   The	   same	  can	  be	   said	   for	  dissemination,	   in	   the	   form	  of	  notice,	   to	  
the	   subject	   of	   the	  drone	  monitoring,	  which	   is	  workable	   for	   law	  enforcement,	  
but	  not	  for	  intelligence	  professionals.133	  
	   Documentation,	   oversight	   and	   reporting	   requirements	   is	   a	   given	   in	   this	  
arena.	  	  It	  applies	  in	  a	  DoD	  context,	  to	  the	  IC	  and	  unquestionably	  should	  apply	  to	  
law	  enforcement	  use	  of	  drones	   in	  the	  States.134	   	  The	  public	  and	  media	  expect	  
transparency.	   	   States	   that	   require	   public	   notice	   of	   drone	   operations,	   images,	  
and	  government	  agency	  drone	  reports	  filed	  are	  likely	  ahead	  of	  the	  power	  curve	  
on	  that	  issue.135	  	  Exceptions	  must	  be	  made	  for	  sensitive	  or	  classified	  intelligence	  
and	  military	  operations.	  
D. Principle	  #4:	  	  Mold	  the	  Remedy	  to	  the	  Violation	  
	   States	  must	  also	  rethink	  the	  remedies	  prescribe	  for	  drone	  bill	  violations.	  	  In	  
addition	  to	  selectively	  using	  particular	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement,	  
many	   proposed	   drone	   bills	   compound	   this	   error	   by	   including	   non-­‐compliance	  
ramifications.	   	  Non-­‐compliance	   ramifications	  often	   fail	   to	  distinguish	  between	  
government	  and	  private	  actors,	  are	  redundant	  of	  existing	  law	  or	  are	  otherwise	  
draconian	  in	  effect.	  	  	  	  
	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  remedy	  for	  law	  enforcement’s	  violation	  of	  the	  
Fourth	  Amendment	  search	  and	  seizure	  provision	  is	  to	  exclude	  the	  evidence,	  or	  
information	   derived	   from	   it,	   at	   a	   criminal	   trial.136	   	   These	   provisions	   are	  
problematic	  only	   insofar	  as	  the	  parent	  bill	   fails	  to	   include	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  
Fourth	   Amendment	   exceptions,	   like	   the	   good	   faith	   and	   inevitable	   discovery	  
doctrinal	   exceptions	   to	   the	   exclusionary	   rule.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Alabama	   bill	  
only	  contains	  allows	  for	  drone	  use	  in	  these	  circumstances:	  	  when	  a	  warrant	  has	  
been	   obtained;	   a	   terrorist	   attack	   is	   imminent;	   there	   is	   danger	   to	   life;	   or	   to	  
pursue	   a	   fleeing	   suspect.	   Thus,	   in	   a	   case	   where	   law	   enforcement	   obtains	  
consent	  and	  uses	  a	  drone,	  an	  Alabama	  court	  would	  be	  required,	  under	  the	  bill,	  
to	   exclude	   it.137	   	   Likewise,	   if	   no	   enumerated	  drone	  bill	   exception	   applies,	   but	  
the	  Alabama	  State	  Police	  would	  have	  inevitably	  discovered	  the	  information	  by	  
means	  other	  than	  a	  drone,	  the	  proposed	  bill	  would	  also	  exclude	  its	  admission.	  	  
This	  type	  of	  separation	  of	  the	  remedy	  from	  its	  historical	  purpose,	  to	  deter	  law	  
                                                
132	  See	  supra	  note	  51.	  
133	  For	  notice	  provisions	  see	  supra	  note	  53.	  
134	  See	  supra	  note	  60	  (discussing	  oversight	  and	  reporting	  requirements).	  
135	  See	  supra	  note	  58-­‐60	  (discussing	  recordkeeping	  and	  public	  reporting	  requirements).	  
136	  See	  supra	  note	  64	  (discussing	  criminal	  exclusionary	  rule	  citations).	  
137	  S.B.	  317,	  148624-­‐2,	  2013	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ala.	  2013).	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enforcement	  misconduct,	  creates	  an	  unnecessary	  windfall	  for	  criminal	  suspects.	  
The	  windfall	  of	  disconnected	  remedy	  and	  purpose	  is	  not	  just	  limited	  to	  criminal	  
suspects.	  	  Some	  states	  preclude	  admission	  of	  drone	  information	  from	  civil	  and	  
administrative	  hearings.138	   	  Generally	   speaking,	  evidence	  obtained	   in	  violation	  
of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment’s	  warrant	  requirements	  does	  not	  preclude	  admission	  
in	  civil	  cases.139	  	  This	  is	  a	  basic	  due	  process	  tenant.	  	  In	  criminal	  cases,	  where	  life	  
and	  liberty	  are	  at	  risk,	  the	  stakes	  are	  higher	  and	  protections	  greater	  than	  in	  civil	  
cases	  –	  or	  even	  lower	  on	  the	  sliding	  scale,	  administrative	  cases—that	  typically	  
involve	  property.	  
	   Several	   state	   drone	   bills	   also	   create	   civil	   and	   criminal	   liability	   against	   law	  
enforcement	   agencies	   or	   individual	   officers	   for	   failing	   to	   abide	   by	   their	  
requirements.	   	  These	  provisions	  may	  very	  well	  have	  a	  chilling	  effect	  on	  public	  
safety.	   	   Imagine	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  of	  a	  Missouri	  police	  officer	  faced	  
with	  the	  choice	  of	  flying	  his	  unmanned	  drone	  or	  a	  manned	  helicopter	  over	  an	  
evacuated	  housing	  area	  in	  the	  direct	  path	  of	  a	  raging	  wildfire.	  	  To	  obtain	  better	  
situational	  awareness	  of	  the	  incident,	  he	  either	  risks	  the	  life	  of	  his	  pilot,	  flies	  a	  
drone	   in	   the	   face	   of	   being	   dragged	   into	   civilian	   court	   for	   wrongfully	   imaging	  
private	   property	   without	   consent	   or	   he	   does	   nothing.140	   	   A	   less	   enviable	  
situation	   would	   be	   that	   of	   the	   state	   or,	   as	   written,	   federal	   law	   enforcement	  
agent	   in	   Georgia	   who,	   to	   save	   a	   life,	   uses	   a	   drone	   without	   a	   warrant	   and	  
subsequently	  gets	  convicted	  of	  a	  misdemeanor.141	  
	   This	  latter	  point	  highlights	  a	  significant	  flaw	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  drone	  bills	  
reviewed.	  	  They	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  government	  actors.	  	  However,	  government	  
actors	  are	  already	  bound	  by	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  	  Private	  actors	  
are	  not.	  Only	  California,	  Hawaii,	  Rhode	  Island,	  Texas	  and	  Washington	  extend	  
their	  bills	  to	  persons	  or	  individuals.142	  	  Even	  these	  conflate	  the	  duties	  imposed	  
on	  government	  and	  private	  actors	  using	  drones.	  	  For	  example,	  Hawaii	  purports	  
make	  it	  unlawful	  for	  an	  “individual”	  to	  operate	  a	  drone	  absent	  consent	  or	  
pursuant	  to	  a	  warrant	  or	  order,	  yet	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  bill’s	  requirements	  
applies	  to,	  “agents	  of	  the	  state	  or	  any	  political	  subdivision	  thereof.”143	  	  Only	  
California	  Senate	  Bill	  No.	  15	  clearly	  delineates	  between	  governmental	  and	  
                                                
138	  See	  supra	  note	  69.	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  U.S.	  v.	  Janis,	  428	  U.S.	  433,	  96	  S.	  Ct.	  3021,	  49	  L.	  Ed.	  2d	  1046	  (1976)(holding	  that	  a	  
determination	  of	  whether	  the	  exclusionary	  rule	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  civil	  proceeding	  involved	  
weighing	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  against	  the	  societal	  costs	  of	  exclusion.	  
Up	  to	  that	  point,	  the	  Court	  had	  never	  applied	  the	  exclusionary	  rule	  to	  exclude	  evidence	  from	  a	  
civil	  proceeding,	  federal	  or	  state).	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  H.B.	  46	  §§	  305.641.1-­‐.3,	  97th	  Gen.	  Assemb.,	  First	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Mo.	  2013).	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  H.B.	  560,	  §	  2(b)-­‐(c),	  68th	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Ga.	  2013)	  (any	  LEA	  of	  the	  US	  or	  GA	  who	  uses	  a	  drone	  
without	  a	  warrant,	  or	  assists	  them,	  	  “shall	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  misdemeanor”).	  
142	  See	  supra	  note	  17.	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  S.B.	  783,	  §	  2563B-­‐2(b),	  27th	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Haw.	  2013).	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private	  drone	  users.144	  As	  mentioned,	  of	  all	  the	  bills	  surveyed,	  only	  the	  New	  
Hampshire	  bill	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  private	  actors.	  	  	  
V. CONCLUSION	  
	   A	  review	  of	  state	  drone	  bills,	  current	  DoD	  domestic	  IO	  policies	  and	  existing	  
Constitutional	   principles	   highlighted	   that	   the	   focus	   of	   legislative	   activity	  
remains	  on	  government	  actors,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  law	  enforcement.	  	  There	  is	  
with	   little	   regard	   for	   the	   second	   and	   third	   order	   effects	   of	   others	   with	  
significant	  equities	   in	  domestic	  drone	  use,	  particularly	   the	  U.S.	  Armed	  Forces.	  	  
The	  way	  ahead	  for	  future	  law	  and	  policy	  is	  simple:	  	  differentiate	  between	  users;	  
focus	   on	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   collection;	   and	   apply	   already	   existing	   relevant	  
principles.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  law	  enforcement	  drone	  collection,	  apply	  the	  full	  range	  
of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protections	  and	  remedies.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  critical	  that	  
state	   legislatures	   propose	   nuanced	   language	   that	   appropriately	   distinguishes	  
law	   enforcement,	   the	   intelligence	   community,	   the	   military	   and	   the	   private	  
sector.	   	   The	   ground	   rules	   for	   each	   type	   of	   actor	   should	   be	   stated	  
unambiguously.	  The	  exemptions	  for	  statutorily	  mandated	  military	  training	  and	  
operations	   should	   be	   clearly	   stated	   and	   free	   of	   the	   threat	   of	   litigation.	   	   The	  
intelligence	   community	   and	   the	   DoD	   have	   tried	   and	   true	   mission-­‐centric	  
intelligence	  oversight	  policies	  that	  allow	  drones	  to	  be	  used	  to	  their	  full	  potential	  
and	   also	   protect	   privacy	   through	   rules	   focused	   on	   collection,	   dissemination,	  
retention	  and	  oversight.	  	  States	  should	  emulate	  them.	  	  Getting	  drone	  legislation	  
right	  is	  critical	  because	  failing	  to	  do	  so	  could	  have	  significant	  consequences	  that	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  S.B.	  No.	  15,	  2013	  Leg.,	  Reg.	  Sess.	  (Cal.	  2013)	  (discussing	  the	  offense	  of	  “Illegal	  Use	  of	  
Unmanned	  Vehicle	  or	  Aircraft	  to	  Capture	  Image”	  in	  terms	  of	  any	  “person”	  who	  commits	  the	  
offense).	  	  
